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I. Introduction
In our modern justice system, over ninety-five percent of
federal criminal cases result in guilty pleas. 1 Guilty pleas are
often the product of direct bargaining between the prosecutor and
defense counsel about the charges against the defendant and the
punishment the prosecution seeks, although a defendant may
choose to plead guilty without any commitment from the
prosecution. 2 The widespread and commonplace role of guilty
pleas 3 in the criminal justice system has far-reaching effects on
1. See Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1388 (2012) (“Ninety-seven
percent of federal convictions and ninety-four percent of state convictions are
the result of guilty pleas.”); Overview of Federal Criminal Cases Fiscal Year
STATES
SENTENCING
COMM’N
4
(June
2016),
2015,
UNITED
http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/researchpublications/2016/FY15_Overview_Federal_Criminal_Cases.pdf
(“Case
Disposition: In fiscal year 2015 the vast majority of offenders (97.1%) pleaded
guilty.”).
2. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 1000 (5th ed. 2009)
(“[M]ore common is explicit bargaining in which the defendant enters a plea of
guilty only after a commitment has been made that concessions will be granted
(or at least sought) in his particular case.”). There are two main types of plea
bargaining that occur during negotiations with a prosecutor. See 2 JOSHUA
DRESSLER & ALAN C. MICHAELS, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL PROCEDURE:
ADJUDICATION 192 (4th ed. 2006). First, the defendant may agree to plead guilty
to a lesser charge or the prosecutor may agree to drop a charge entirely (“charge
bargaining”). Id. Second, the defendant may agree to plead guilty in exchange
for the prosecutor’s recommendation of a sentence agreed upon by the
defendant, or the prosecutor may agree not to object to the defendant’s
requested sentence (“sentence bargaining”). Id.
3. This Note uses the terms “guilty plea” and “plea deal” interchangeably
to indicate a negotiated plea bargain resulting in a guilty plea.
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the rights of defendants, including the constitutional right to a
jury trial, the right to counsel, and the privilege against selfincrimination. 4 In particular, appeal waivers prevent a defendant
from appealing parts of his conviction, often including his
sentence. 5 Because the right to appeal exists in a legal purgatory,
lingering somewhere above a purely statutory right but not rising
to the level of a constitutionally guaranteed right, 6 appeal
waivers draw concerns about lack of procedural fairness and
abuse by prosecutors and defense counsel alike. 7
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 118 provides the
advisements and questions that a judge must include in his
determination that the defendant is entering a valid guilty plea. 9
Rule 11(b)(1)(N) 10 requires that the judge determine on the record
that the defendant understands he waives his right to future
appeals. 11 This Note advocates that Rule 11(b)(1)(N) is unique
because it concerns appellate waiver. 12 As such, when a judge
deviates from the rule, the standard of review should not be only
4. See discussion infra Part II.A (discussing the requirements to protect a
defendant’s constitutional rights when he enters a guilty plea).
5. See Trial Judge to Appeals Court: Review Me, N.Y. TIMES (July 16,
2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/17/opinion/trial-judge-to-appeals-courtreview-me.html?_r=0 (last visited Mar. 2, 2017) (“Congress gave appeals courts
the power to review federal sentences to ensure the government applies the law
reasonably and consistently. Without an appeals court’s policing, the odds go up
that prosecutors will do neither.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
6. See discussion infra Part III.A (advocating that appellate rights occupy
a role protected by the criminal justice system).
7. See discussion infra Part V (arguing that some degree of due process is
required within an appeal, although there is no due process right to access the
appellate process); see also Trial Judge to Appeals Court: Review Me, supra note
5 (“Waivers are a common but largely hidden element of plea bargains—which,
in many federal cases, aren’t really bargains because the power of prosecutors is
often so much greater than that of the defendants or their lawyers.”).
8. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11.
9. See discussion infra Part II.B (recounting the purpose and standards
under Rule 11 to ensure the guilty plea is voluntary and intelligent).
10. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(1)(N).
11. See discussion infra Part III.B (examining the effects of appellate
waiver on a defendant’s ability to appeal constitutional and procedural defects).
12. See discussion infra Part III.B (analyzing the policy concerns behind
widespread use of appellate waiver).
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the objective standard articulated in United States v. Dominguez
Benitez, 13 which concerned a different Rule 11 violation. 14
Instead, appellate courts should add a voluntariness and
intelligence inquiry for review of Rule 11(b)(1)(N) errors. 15
Many federal circuit courts already conduct the additional
voluntary and intelligent inquiry when examining Rule
11(b)(1)(N) errors. 16 However, the circuits lack uniformity in
articulation and application, such that a split of authority arises
between the courts over the method of analysis and standard of
review. 17 Without consistency among the circuits, defendants fare
differently in challenging the enforceability of their appellate
waivers, which are meant to prevent an appellate court from
hearing appeals on the merits. 18 Expressly adopting the
voluntariness and intelligence inquiry alongside the objective
standard from Dominguez Benitez ensures that the circuits
reviewing plea hearing colloquies for Rule 11(b)(1)(N) errors find
the same showing of prejudice. 19

13. 542 U.S. 74 (2004).
14. See discussion infra Part V (arguing that the standard in Dominguez
Benitez alone is insufficient to review Rule 11(b)(1)(N) errors, but further noting
that it may be adequate for review of other Rule 11 errors outside the scope of
this Note). In Dominguez Benitez, the Court ruled that the defendant had to
show that he would not have pleaded guilty had the judge advised the defendant
that he could not withdraw his plea if the court did not accept the government’s
sentencing recommendation. See discussion infra Part III.D.
15. See discussion infra Parts IV & V (surveying the various circuits’
approaches to the voluntariness and intelligence inquiry and arguing why the
additional test should be included).
16. See discussion infra Parts IV.B–C (examining the approaches of the
First, Second, Third, Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits, which
acknowledge or include a voluntariness and intelligence inquiry in plain error
review of Rule 11(b)(1)(N) errors).
17. See discussion infra Part IV (presenting the muddled approaches of the
circuits as falling into three general categories: circuits that apply solely the
objective test, circuits that apply the voluntariness and intelligence examination
but do not expressly acknowledge it, and circuits that conduct a voluntariness
and intelligence examination).
18. See discussion infra Parts IV & V (analyzing various outcomes under
the circuits’ inconsistent approaches to appellate waiver).
19. See discussion infra Part V (advocating the positive effects and policy
implications of adopting the voluntariness and intelligence inquiry).
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Part II of this Note develops the landscape of the
constitutional and procedural requirements for ensuring a
defendant’s guilty plea is valid. 20 Part III examines appellate
waiver and federal case law on appealing guilty pleas and
establishes the standards for plain error review of Rule 11
violations in general. 21 Part IV details the various approaches of
the federal circuit courts regarding review of Rule 11(b)(1)(N)
errors, with a focus on the circuits that add a voluntary and
intelligent inquiry to the objective standard of review. 22 In Part
V, this Note advocates that adding a voluntary and intelligent
inquiry to the objective standard satisfies due process concerns
and analyzes the effects of implementing such an inquiry. 23 Part
V concludes that adding the voluntariness and intelligence
inquiry for plain error review of Rule 11(b)(1)(N) violations
ensures that a defendant understands the rights he waives in a
guilty plea with an appellate waiver. 24
II. Receiving the Guilty Plea
A. Voluntary and Intelligent Requirement
The Supreme Court has varied its treatment of guilty pleas
over the last century, reflecting the progression of the role the
guilty plea plays in the modern justice system. The Court first
stated the constitutional requirements for accepting a guilty plea
pursuant to a plea deal in Kercheval v. United States, 25 in which
20. See discussion infra Part II (noting that appellate rights are safeguards
meant to protect the defendant’s rights and Congress intended Rule 11(b)(1)(N)
to be the procedural mechanism for that protection).
21. See discussion infra Part III (setting up the framework for plain error
review).
22. See discussion infra Part IV (offering the approaches to review).
23. See discussion infra Part V (elaborating on the due process rights
guaranteed in the appellate process, even if the right to appeal is not a due
process requirement).
24. See discussion infra Part V (arguing that the voluntariness and
intelligence inquiry ensures consistency in outcomes for defendants across the
circuits).
25. 274 U.S. 220 (1927).
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the Court established the voluntary and intelligent standard. 26
Forty years later, the Court elaborated on the constitutional
requirements for a guilty plea in the landmark case Boykin v.
Alabama. 27 Under Boykin, an appellate court must find reversible
error when the record does not reflect that the defendant
voluntarily and intelligently entered the guilty plea. 28 The waiver
of rights encompassed by a guilty plea cannot be inferred or
presumed from a silent record because highly protected
constitutional rights are at stake, including the right to trial by
jury, the right to confrontation, and the privilege against
self-incrimination. 29 A defendant who enters a guilty plea
26. See id. at 223 (“[A] plea of guilty shall not be accepted unless made
voluntarily after proper advice and with full understanding of the
consequences.”). Throughout different jurisdictions, courts refer to the
“understanding” requirement as “intelligent” or “knowing.” See Mary K.
Wheeler, Guilty Plea Colloquies: Let the Record Show . . . , 45 MONT. L. REV. 295,
296 n.5 (1984). By most accounts, the three terms refer to the same
constitutional standard. See id. (“The concept of understanding has also been
expressed through use of the terms ‘intelligent’ and ‘knowing.’ Many courts use
these terms interchangeably.”).
27. See Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242 (1969) (“It was error, plain on
the face of the record, for the trial judge to accept petitioner’s guilty plea
without an affirmative showing that it was intelligent and voluntary.”). In
Boykin, the defendant entered a guilty plea after he was indicted for five counts
of robbery in Alabama state court. Id. at 239. At the guilty plea hearing, the
judge did not engage the defendant in colloquy or question him in open court. Id.
Although the Alabama Supreme Court affirmed the death sentence imposed by
the jury, it raised the issue of the constitutionality of the guilty plea colloquy at
the defendant’s automatic appeal. Id. at 240. Finding that the issue was
properly before the Court on appeal, it concluded that the judge’s failure to
engage in colloquy with the defendant required reversal of the defendant’s
guilty plea because there was no evidence of voluntariness and intelligence on
the record. Id. at 242.
28. See id. at 244 (affirming the Alabama Supreme Court justices who
dissented at the defendant’s appeal and agreeing that “there was reversible
error because the record [did] not disclose that the defendant voluntarily and
understandingly entered his pleas of guilty” (internal quotation marks
omitted)); see also Boykin v. State, 207 So. 2d 412, 415 (Ala. 1968) (Goodwyn, J.,
dissenting)
We do not say that the trial judge may not accept a plea of guilty in a
capital case, but if he does so he must see to it, first, that the plea is
entirely voluntary and that the defendant fully realizes and is
competent to know the consequences of such a plea.
(citations omitted).
29. See Boykin, 395 U.S. at 243 (“We cannot presume a waiver of these
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inevitably surrenders these constitutional rights. 30 Thus, courts
must pay special attention to whether the waiver is voluntary
and intelligent.
Although posited together in Boykin, the voluntariness and
intelligence requirements have individually garnered their own
jurisprudence as the Supreme Court narrowed the scope of each
concept. In Brady v. United States, 31 the Supreme Court
articulated the standard for voluntariness of a guilty plea as
a plea of guilty entered by one fully aware of the direct
consequences, including the actual value of any commitments
made to him by the court, prosecutor, or his own counsel, must
stand unless induced by threats (or promises to discontinue
improper
harassment),
misrepresentation
(including
unfulfilled or unfulfillable promises), or perhaps by promises
that are by their nature improper as having no proper
relationship to the prosecutor’s business (e.g. bribes). 32
three important federal rights from a silent record.”). In the opinion, the Court
referenced landmark cases that created constitutional protections for
defendants under the umbrella of due process, including Duncan v. Louisiana,
391 U.S. 145 (1968) (ruling that the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates the
right to jury trial for serious offenses to states courts), Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S.
400 (1965) (concluding that the Sixth Amendment applies to states through the
Fourteenth Amendment), and Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964) (deciding that
the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees a defendant the privilege against
self-incrimination). Boykin, 395 U.S. at 243.
30. See LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 2, at 1048–49 (“[I]n the wake of Boykin,
most jurisdictions revised their procedures for taking pleas so that defendants
were specifically warned of the constitutional rights lost by entry of a plea other
than not guilty.”).
31. 397 U.S. 742 (1970).
32. Id. at 755 (quoting Shelton v. United States, 246 F.2d 571, 572 (5th Cir.
1957) (en banc), rev’d on other grounds, 356 U.S. 26 (1958)) (ruling that fear of
the imposition of the death sentence did not make the defendant’s guilty plea
involuntary). In Brady, the defendant pleaded guilty under a kidnapping statute
that allowed a jury to recommend the death penalty if he chose to proceed to
trial. Id. at 743. Previously, in United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570 (1968), the
Court held that the death penalty portion of the kidnapping statute was
unconstitutional because it tended to discourage defendants from exercising
their right to a jury trial for fear of the jury imposing the death penalty. Brady,
397 U.S. at 746–47. In his petition for relief, Brady argued that every guilty plea
entered under the kidnapping statute overturned in Jackson should be
invalidated. Id. at 747. The Court rejected the defendant’s arguments entirely
and ruled that “a plea of guilty is not invalid merely because entered to avoid
the possibility of a death penalty.” Id. at 755. Referencing similar language as in
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As stated in Brady, the “relevant circumstances” surrounding a
plea are the strongest indicators of whether the defendant
entered the guilty plea voluntarily. 33 Notably, the Court held
that, even though the defendant’s plea “may well have been
motivated in part by a desire to avoid a possible death penalty,
we are convinced that his plea was voluntarily and intelligently
made and we have no reason to doubt that his solemn admission
of guilt was truthful.” 34 The defendant was not subject to threats
of physical harm or coercion, was appointed competent counsel,
and was questioned by the judge before the judge accepted the
plea. 35 Combined, these factors satisfied the Court that Brady
entered his plea voluntarily. 36 The Court concluded that,
although fear of the maximum penalty is a common motivation
for a defendant to enter a guilty plea, it does not render a guilty
plea involuntary. 37

Kercheval, the Court described a plea as “more than an admission of past
conduct; it is the defendant’s consent that judgment of conviction may be
entered without a trial—a waiver of his right to trial before a jury or a judge.”
Id. at 748.
33. See id. at 749 (“The voluntariness of Brady’s plea can be determined
only by considering all of the relevant circumstances surrounding it.”). Although
plea bargaining occurred under the table in the past, “today the prevailing
practice is for the voluntariness inquiry to include a determination of whether a
plea agreement has been reached and, if so, what it is.” See LAFAVE ET AL., supra
note 2, at 1043 (providing an overview of the voluntariness inquiry the court
performs to accept the defendant’s guilty plea pursuant to a plea deal).
34. Brady, 397 U.S. at 758.
35. See id. at 749 (summarizing why the record established the defendant’s
voluntariness).
36. See id. (examining the circumstances surrounding the defendant’s
decision to enter a guilty plea). The Court further elaborated that the defendant
had “full opportunity to assess the advantages and disadvantages of a trial as
compared with those attending a plea of guilty” and that “there was no hazard
of an impulsive and improvident response to a seeming but unreal advantage.”
Id. at 754. Finally, the trial judge’s colloquy in open court was more than
satisfactory because the judge was “obviously sensitive to the requirements of
the law with respect to guilty pleas.” Id. at 754–55.
37. See id. at 752 (“For a defendant who sees slight possibility of acquittal,
the advantages of pleading guilty and limiting the probable penalty are
obvious—his exposure is reduced, the correctional processes can begin
immediately, and the practical burdens of a trial are eliminated.”).
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In Henderson v. Morgan, 38 the Supreme Court elaborated on
the intelligence requirement 39 and ruled that the defendant must
possess “a demonstrable understanding of only those elements
deemed ‘critical’ to a particular offense.” 40 Not only was the
defendant uninformed of the “critical” element of intent for the
second-degree murder charge to which he pleaded, but there were
various other circumstantial indications that the defendant did
not understand the nature of his guilty plea. 41 Notably, the
defendant’s prior classification as a “retarded” prepubescent and
being only nineteen years old at the time of indictment factored
heavily into the Court’s evaluation of the defendant’s capacity for
understanding. 42 The Court further examined the role of capacity
to plead guilty in Godinez v. Moran, 43 in which it considered
whether the same standard for competency applies for standing
trial, waiving counsel, and entering a guilty plea. 44 In finding
38. 426 U.S. 637 (1976).
39. Id. at 645 (“[T]he plea could not be voluntary in the sense that it
constituted an intelligent admission that he committed the offense unless the
defendant received real notice of the true nature of the charge against him . . . .”
(internal citation and quotation marks omitted)). The defendant in Henderson
was indicted for first-degree murder and pleaded guilty to second-degree
murder. Id. at 638. At sentencing, the defendant testified that he “meant no
harm to that lady” when he entered her room with a knife and stabbed her. Id.
at 643. In his petition for habeas corpus relief, the defendant claimed that his
guilty plea was not voluntary and intelligent because he did not know “that
intent to cause death was an element of the offense.” Id. at 639. Because the
record indicated that the defendant was not informed about all of the “critical”
elements of the charge to which he pleaded, the Court found that the guilty plea
was not intelligent and was, therefore, unenforceable. Id. at 647.
40. See Julian A. Cook, Federal Guilty Pleas Under Rule 11: The
Unfulfilled Promise of the Post-Boykin Era, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 597, 602
(2002) (discussing the scope of Henderson’s effect on the voluntary and
intelligent requirement).
41. See Henderson, 426 U.S. at 646 (“There is nothing in this record that
can serve as a substitute for either a finding after trial, or a voluntary
admission, that respondent had the requisite intent.”).
42. See id. at 641–42 (noting the importance of the defendant’s history of
delayed mental development and age at the time of offense).
43. 509 U.S. 389 (1993).
44. See id. at 398 (“And while the decision to plead guilty is undeniably a
profound one, it is no more complicated than the sum total of decisions that a
defendant may be called upon to make during the course of a trial.”).
Furthermore, states are free to implement “competency standards that are more
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that the competency standards were the same, the Court also
determined that the intelligence requirement mandates that the
defendant have the capacity to enter a guilty plea. 45
In these landmark cases, the Supreme Court attempted to
provide clear protections for the defendants’ constitutional rights
by requiring guilty pleas to be voluntary and intelligent. But even
after elaboration upon these standards, lower courts still
struggled to grasp the substance of what it meant for a plea to be
voluntary and intelligent. 46 Consequently, Congress implemented
procedural safeguards to protect the constitutional and due
process rights at stake in a guilty plea. 47
B. Procedural Requirement: Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 11
Congress enacted Rule 11 in 1944 to create procedural
requirements for a judge to accept a guilty plea in open court. 48
Rule 11 underwent various changes, although few were notable
until Congress added the factual basis requirement in 1966. 49
While most guilty pleas involve a waiver of constitutional rights
and an actual admission of guilt, “the latter element is not a
constitutional requisite to the imposition of criminal penalty.” 50
elaborate . . . [but] the Due Process Clause does not impose these additional
requirements.” Id. at 402.
45. See id. (“[A] trial court must satisfy itself that the waiver of his
constitutional rights is knowing and voluntary.”).
46. See discussion infra Part IV (analyzing cases on appeal in which the
district courts differed on their determinations of voluntariness and intelligence
for the guilty plea).
47. See discussion infra Part II.B (detailing the procedural requirements
under Rule 11 for the court’s colloquy at the guilty plea hearing).
48. See Cook, supra note 40, at 606 (providing the history of Rule 11); see
also id. at 606–12 (offering a detailed examination of the Advisory Committee
notes and amendments over the life of Rule 11).
49. See id. at 606 n.52 (discussing the factual basis addition to Rule 11);
FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(3) (“Before entering judgment on a guilty plea, the court
must determine that there is a factual basis for the plea.”).
50. North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37 (1970) (“An individual accused
of crime may voluntarily, knowingly, and understandingly consent to the
imposition of a prison sentence even if he is unwilling or unable to admit his
participation in the acts constituting the crime.”). In Alford, the defendant was
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In North Carolina v. Alford, 51 the Court cautioned, however, that
“the prohibitions against involuntary or unintelligent pleas
should not be relaxed, but neither should an exercise in arid logic
render those constitutional guarantees counterproductive and put
in jeopardy the very human values they were meant to
preserve.” 52
After confirming the application of the factual basis rule in
Alford, in 1975 Rule 11 underwent its most dramatic changes in
light of Boykin v. Alabama. 53 The 1975 alterations moved Rule 11
closer to its appearance today by requiring the judge to address
the defendant in open court regarding his understanding of the
charges, adequacy of counsel, constitutional rights, and
mandatory maximum and minimum penalties. 54 Importantly, the
Rule 11 amendments expressly acknowledged the existence of
plea bargaining outside of the courtroom and instructed the judge
on determining whether the plea was voluntary and intelligent in
direct response to Boykin. 55
Following these amendments, Rule 11’s requirements have
only lengthened and range today from the constitutional
advisements referenced in Boykin56 to purely statutory
information about the mandatory maximum and minimum
sentences. 57 Under Rule 11, a “guilty plea is valid only if it
indicted for first-degree murder and pleaded guilty to second-degree murder
after considering the overwhelming evidence against him. Id. at 26–27. Alford
testified at his hearing that he did not commit the crime, but decided to plead
guilty to avoid a possible death sentence. Id. at 28. The court accepted his plea
because it found sufficient evidence that the defendant committed the crime,
despite Alford’s denial. Id. at 37.
51. 400 U.S. 25 (1970).
52. Id. at 39.
53. See 395 U.S. 238, 242 (1969) (developing the voluntary and intelligent
requisite for guilty pleas); supra notes 27–29 and accompanying text (examining
Boykin).
54. See Cook, supra note 40, at 607–08 (citing Act of July 31, 1975, Pub. L.
No. 94-64, 89 Stat. 370) (discussing the 1975 amendments and their effect on
expanding the role and comprehensiveness of Rule 11 in the guilty plea process).
55. See id. at 608–09 (noting that this development was a direct reaction to
the Boykin voluntariness and intelligence requirement).
56. See discussion supra Part II.A (detailing the constitutional
requirements for guilty pleas).
57. See infra notes 131–132 and accompanying text (describing particular
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demonstrates on the record that the defendant has knowingly
and voluntarily waived his constitutional rights.” 58 Rule 11(b)(1)
requires that the judge address the defendant personally in
open court to inform the defendant, and to determine that the
defendant personally understands, that the defendant will be
waiving the following rights by pleading guilty: (1) the right
not to plead guilty; (2) the right to a jury trial; (3) the right to
be represented by counsel; (4) the nature of the charge to
which the defendant is pleading; (5) any mandatory minimum
penalty; (6) any maximum possible penalty; (7) the defendant’s
waiver of certain appeal rights; and (8) the government’s right
to use the defendant’s statements in a perjury prosecution. 59

Only when the court is satisfied that the defendant understands
each of these advisements and voluntarily waives these rights
may the judge accept the guilty plea. 60
III. Appealing the Guilty Plea
A. Appellate Rights
The Supreme Court has never expressly recognized a
constitutional right to appeal in criminal or civil cases. 61 The
Rule 11 requirements).
58. See ERWIN CHEMERINKSY & LAURIE L. LEVENSON, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
666 (2008) (“Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 is designed to accomplish
this goal.”).
59. Id. Of all the advisements in Rule 11, these eight advisements are the
most relevant for the scope of a defendant’s appeal and the discussion in this
Note.
60. See id. (analyzing the Rule 11 procedure for colloquy to accept the
guilty plea in open court).
61. See Cassandra Burke Robertson, The Right to Appeal, 91 N.C. L. REV.
1219, 1222 (2013) (discussing the Supreme Court’s avoidance of ruling on the
constitutional requirements for appellate rights). Furthermore, the Court has
stated in dicta that there is no due process requirement that the states or the
federal government must provide for a right of appeal. See, e.g., Jones v. Barnes,
463 U.S. 745, 751 (1983) (“[T]here is of course no constitutional right to
appeal . . . .”); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 18 (1956) (“It is true that a State is
not required by the Federal Constitution to provide appellate courts or a right to
appellate review at all.”); Reetz v. Michigan, 188 U.S. 505, 508 (1903) (“Neither
is the right of appeal essential to due process of law.”); McKane v. Durston, 153
U.S. 684, 687 (1894) (ruling that due process does not require access to appeal).
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Court’s avoidance is in part due to the fact that the federal courts
and almost every state court system provide for some level of
appeal as of right. 62 Despite the Supreme Court’s refusal to
recognize a constitutional requirement for appellate rights, the
Court has opined on the degree of due process required when a
statute or state constitution set forth an appeals process. 63 The
Supreme Court’s attention to the prophylactic role of the right to
appeal reveals that it is an essential element of the modern
American justice system within the constitutional purview of due
process. 64
Appeals may arise from various procedural postures and
causes of action after a criminal conviction. Defendants can file for
appeal regarding issues from trial that resulted in conviction; 65 the
sufficiency of the evidence; 66 the enforceability of a guilty plea; 67
62. See Robertson, supra note 61, at 1222 n.8 (noting that at least the
states of New Hampshire, West Virginia, and Virginia do not require automatic
appeals as a matter of right for certain defendants). In most states and the
federal court system, appeals are provided under state constitutional or
statutory requirements. See id. at 1222.
63. See infra notes 250–252 and accompanying text (claiming that although
the Court has ruled there is no due process guarantee to access the appellate
process, due process does guarantee certain aspects of an appeal if one is
provided, including the right to effective assistance of counsel and appointment
of counsel for direct appeal).
64. See discussion infra Part V (arguing that the modern American court
system places heavy importance on the right to appeal and has shaped itself
according to the premise that a defendant has access to the appellate process).
65. A defendant can appeal a multitude of issues if they were raised or
argued at the trial level, including but not limited to allegations of Fourth
Amendment violations committed by the state to obtain evidence; Sixth
Amendment challenges regarding the right to confrontation of witnesses;
challenges to discrimination during jury selection; and violations of disclosure
requirements of discovery material. See generally CHEMERINKSY & LEVENSON,
supra note 58 (presenting the legal foundation for appealable issues in
investigating and adjudicating criminal cases).
66. On appeal, a defendant may argue that the evidence was insufficient to
support his conviction and that the prosecution did not carry its burden of
proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. See, e.g., Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S.
307, 319 (1979) (stating the inquiry for sufficiency of the evidence is “whether,
after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any
rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond
a reasonable doubt”).
67. See discussion infra Part IV (presenting the different approaches of the
federal circuits when deciding whether to enforce appellate waiver in a
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the defendant’s sentence; 68 and habeas corpus and post-conviction
(“collateral attack”) relief. 69 Each of these paths has varying
effects on an appeal because the underlying issues may require
shifts in the burden framework or reliance on different
presumptions. 70
The effect of a guilty plea on a defendant’s ability to appeal is
generally that it bars the defendant from raising constitutional
defendant’s appeal from a guilty plea).
68. A defendant can also appeal his sentence under the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines if he believes the court miscalculated his guideline range based on
factors influencing his offense level, including his criminal history, or if he can
show that the judge exceeded the maximum range in the guidelines without
cause. See CHEMERINKSY & LEVENSON, supra note 58, at 817 (discussing the
revolution of federal sentencing under Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466
(2000), and its progeny).
69. A defendant may file a petition for a writ of habeas corpus after he has
been convicted of a crime and exhausted all other possible appellate routes. Id.
at 921. Historically, a writ of habeas corpus is a mechanism for releasing a
prisoner from unlawful detention by the state. See LARRY W. YACKLE, FEDERAL
COURTS 571–73 (3d ed. 2009) (noting that if the court grants the writ, the state
must release the defendant from custody). Defendants that file for habeas
corpus relief are often already incarcerated and petition the court to show there
is no “lawful basis for depriving the prisoner of liberty.” See id. at 571 (“[T]he
federal court focuses exclusively on the legal validity of the prisoner’s current
detention.”). Because federal courts lack the jurisdictional grant to directly
review state cases, a petition for a writ of federal habeas corpus is a separate
civil suit for “collateral relief.” See id. at 572 (illuminating the technical
language surrounding habeas corpus and collateral review). The federal courts
can also entertain motions from federal prisoners under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, which
is almost the only route for a federal prisoner to pursue collateral review. See id.
at 572–73 (claiming that today, the “only practical difference” posed by Section
2255 is that a federal prisoner files his petition in the sentencing court, as
opposed to the district court closest to the penitentiary).
70. See id. at 572–73 (noting that the most prevalent distinction in the
types of appeals is the difference between direct review (often of sentencing) and
collateral relief). For the purposes of the ongoing discussion, these paths to
appeal will be treated the same because this Note focuses on the standard of
review once the appeal has been granted. Whether the appeal is founded in
direct review, collateral relief, or Section 2255 is immaterial because this Note
proposes a standard of review applicable to any of these procedural postures
when the defendant challenges his appeal waiver. See Parts IV & V (noting
when procedural posture is inconsequential). Footnotes will denote when it is
necessary to distinguish the procedural history that led to an appeal and why
such a distinction is required (e.g., when the court distinguished the petitioner’s
case because it arose from a habeas corpus petition, as opposed to a direct
appeal of conviction or sentencing).
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issues that he may have successfully appealed after conviction at
trial. 71 In McMann v. Richardson, 72 the Court ruled that the
defendants could not appeal constitutional issues not raised at
trial. 73 Because the defendants admitted their guilt in open court,
they were convicted based upon their admissions, not their
coerced confessions. 74 The Court carved out an exception to this
rule in Blackledge v. Perry 75 and determined that a prosecutor’s
abuse of discretion in charging a defendant could be raised after
the defendant entered a guilty plea. 76 The effects of the McMann
and Blackledge lines of cases are still disputed. 77 It is essential,
71. See LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 2, at 1063 (describing the consequences
of a guilty plea on the defendant’s right to appeal constitutional issues).
72. 397 U.S. 759 (1970).
73. See id. at 773 (rejecting the defendants’ constitutional claims).
74. See id. (deciding that the defendants were not entitled to relief because
their coerced confessions were never submitted to a jury and were, therefore,
“not the basis for the judgment”); see also Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258,
267 (1973) (“When a criminal defendant has solemnly admitted in open court
that he is in fact guilty of the offense with which he is charged, he may not
thereafter raise independent claims relating to the deprivation of constitutional
rights that occurred prior to the entry of the guilty plea.”).
75. See Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 29 (1974) (“Due process of law
requires that such a potential for vindictiveness must not enter into North
Carolina’s two-tiered appellate process.”). In Blackledge, the defendant was
convicted in the district court of a misdemeanor and appealed his sentence to
the superior court. Id. at 22. Under North Carolina law, a defendant could
appeal his district court conviction and receive a trial de novo in the superior
court. Id. After the defendant filed the notice of appeal, the prosecutor obtained
a grand jury indictment for felony charges based on the same conduct for which
the defendant was convicted in the district court. Id. at 23. The Court agreed
that if the “prosecutor has the means readily at hand to discourage such
appeals—by ‘upping the ante’ through a felony indictment whenever a convicted
misdemeanant pursues his statutory appellate remedy—the State can insure
that only the most hardy defendants will brave the hazards of a de novo trial.”
Id. at 27–28.
76. See id. at 28 (“A person convicted of an offense is entitled to pursue his
statutory right to a trial de novo, without apprehension that the State will
retaliate by substituting a more serious charge for the original one, thus
subjecting him to a significantly increased potential period of incarceration.”);
discussion infra Part V (discussing Supreme Court precedent establishing due
process rights in the appeals process, despite the Court’s refusal to acknowledge
a due process right to appeal).
77. See LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 2, at 1064 (discussing subsequent cases
in which the Court evaluated whether a defendant could pursue his appeal on
constitutional grounds).
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however, to note that constitutional issues arising after the
defendant enters a guilty plea are distinguishable from “defects
in the procedure by which the plea was received or circumstances
making the plea other than voluntary, knowing, and
intelligent.” 78 Therefore, while a defendant’s guilty plea may
generally bar constitutional issues from appeal, courts examine
procedural issues affecting the validity of the guilty plea under a
different standard of review on appeal. 79
B. Appellate Waivers
Appeal waivers are express provisions in plea agreements
that require the defendant to waive his right to future appeal for
issues that arose at trial or for review of sentencing. 80 Federal
circuits, and even district courts, differ when considering which
terms are standard for plea deals and what requirements are
included in an appeal waiver. 81 The debate over the increased
popularity and use of appellate waivers in guilty pleas involves
weighing norms of the American justice system; most
importantly, this includes balancing efficiency and fairness. 82
Appeal waivers have been uniformly upheld as constitutional by
all of the circuits; 83 in cases in which a court struck down an

78. See id. at 1067 (noting the differences between constitutional and
procedural grounds for appeal).
79. See discussion infra Part III.C (providing the foundation of plain error
review of Rule 11 errors during guilty plea colloquy).
80. See Nancy J. King & Michael E. O’Neill, Appeal Waivers and the Future
of Sentencing Policy, 55 DUKE L.J. 209, 211 (2005) (presenting the appeal waiver
as a method of regulating sentencing in the post-Booker and Blakeley guidelines
framework, which made the U.S. Federal Sentencing Guidelines advisory).
81. See id. at 211 (“Scholars and litigants disagree about what is waived, by
whom, at what price, and how often.”).
82. See LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 2, at 1002 (“[A] concern expressed about
the plea negotiation system is that, by its nature, it is likely to produce unfair or
inaccurate results.”).
83. See Cook, supra note 40, at 629 (noting that every circuit has upheld
the validity of appellate waivers); see also Michael O’Shaughnessy, Appellate
Review of Sentences, 88 GEO. L.J. 1637, 1637–38 (2000) (discussing the circuits
that affirm the constitutionality of the appeal waivers).
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appeal waiver, the court typically found the waiver unenforceable
for a specific reason. 84
Historically, the debate over the benefits and costs of
enforcing appellate waivers intensified under the Sentencing
Reform Act of 1984 (the Act) 85 because appellate review “emerged
as the primary enforcement mechanism for sentencing reform in
federal courts.” 86 In particular, the practice of “fact bargaining”
escalated under the Act, in which prosecutors and defendants
negotiate stipulations about the facts of a case or the defendant’s
criminal history that the court would usually determine. 87 The
purpose of the stipulations is for the court to use them to
sentence the defendant under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines
(“the Guidelines”). 88 However, the prosecution often requires the
defendant to waive his appellate rights in return for beneficial
84. See discussion infra Part IV (detailing the circumstances under which
federal circuits have found appellate waivers unenforceable).
85. Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. § 3551 (1984) (Added Pub.L.
98-473, Title II, § 212(a)(2), Oct. 12, 1984, 98 Stat. 1988; amended Pub.L.
101-647, Title XVI, § 1602, Nov. 29, 1990, 104 Stat. 4843; codified as amended
at 18 U.S.C. §3551(2012)).
86. See King & O’Neill, supra note 80, at 214 (arguing that the appeals
process for guilty pleas is the “glue holding these new presumptive sentencing
systems together” under the sentencing reform movement). For a discussion of
sentencing reform in the United States, see William W. Wilkins, Jr. & John R.
Steer, The Role of Sentencing Guideline Amendments in Reducing Unwarranted
Sentencing Disparity, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 63, 64 (1993) (“Congress was
motivated by several primary objectives in enacting sentencing reform
legislation, but none was more important than increasing fairness and
uniformity in sentencing.”). From the sentencing reform movement, defendants
gained the opportunity to raise various sentencing issues on appeal, including
the factors upon which the judge relied in sentencing. See King & O’Neill, supra
note 80, at 220–21 (analyzing some of these factors). Prosecutors and courts
responded by advocating appellate waivers in an effort to conserve resources
and promote efficiency in sentencing. See discussion infra Part V (elaborating on
the effects that appeal waivers have on efficiency and fairness in the criminal
justice system).
87. See King & O’Neill, supra note 80, at 215–16 (detailing the process of
fact bargaining in guilty pleas and the concessions the defendant makes).
88. See id. at 215 (“[P]arties have manipulated the application of the
Guidelines through stipulations, expressly resolving sentencing facts and
Guidelines ‘scoring’ questions as part of the plea agreement.”); id. at 216 (noting
a benefit to fact bargaining is the higher degree of certainty that results from
nailing down facts “to obtain specific sentence reductions”).
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stipulations under the Guidelines. 89 Concerns about stipulations
arise from the argument that “[t]he increased use of stipulations,
combined with waiver of review, increases the risk that sentences
not in compliance with the law will proliferate without
scrutiny.” 90 Moreover, the legal exemptions from review of certain
discretionary decisions by prosecutors have further deteriorated
the role of appellate review as anticipated by the sentencing
reform movement. 91
Prosecutors and courts expressed support for appeal waivers
as the popularity and use of waivers escalated in the 1990s. 92 In
response, Congress amended Rule 11 in 1999 to include a
89. See id. at 235–36 tbls. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 & 6 (“Specifically, as shown in Tables
2 and 3, those who waived appeal were more likely than nonwaiving defendants
to receive a promise by the government to seek a safety valve reduction
(applicable in drug cases only), as well as to actually receive downward
departures.”). In their study, King and O’Neill conducted interviews with
various federal prosecutors, defenders, and defendants about appellate waivers.
See id. at 209–10, 225 (detailing the sampling from which the authors conducted
their analysis). They also examined data collected from 971 random cases
sentenced under the federal guidelines. Id. at 209–210. Tables 1–6 show their
analyses for the types of departures and assistance that benefited defendants
under the federal guidelines and whether the defendant had waived his
appellate rights or not. Id. at 235–38. While some of the analysis showed no real
variance in the defendants’ sentences, the results tended to show that in more
than one out of five waiver cases, a defendant received a downward departure
(other than substantial assistance). Id. at 238. Only one out of ten nonwaiver
defendants received the same treatment, reflecting a double rate of assistance
for waiving defendants. Id.
90. See id. at 213 (echoing opponents’ concerns about widespread use of
blanket waivers).
91. See id. at 218 (claiming federal laws that prevent review of
discretionary decisions has weakened appellate review). Specifically, the
inability to review prosecutorial discretion includes: downward departures for a
defendant’s cooperation (see id. at 218 n.38 (citing U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES
MANUAL § 5K1.1 (2004))), safety valve motions for imposing a sentence below
the minimum (see id. at 218 n.39 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e)–(f) (2000))),
reduction under Rule 35 for substantial assistance (see id. at 218 n.40 (citing
FED. R. CRIM. P. 35(b))), and reduction for accepting responsibility (see id. at 218
n.41 (citing U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3E1.1 (2004))).
92. See id. at 221–24 (noting that in a Federal Judicial Center survey, over
60% of responding circuit and district federal judges advocated using appeal
waivers “more frequently”) (citing MOLLY TREADWAY JOHNSON & SCOTT A.
GILBERT, FED. JUD. CTR., THE U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES, RESULTS OF THE
FEDERAL
JUDICIAL
CENTER’S
1996
SURVEY
22
tbl.14
(1997),
http://www2.fjc.gov/sites/default/files/2012/gssurvey.pdf).
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requirement for the court to discuss appeal waivers when
accepting a guilty plea. 93 The amendment arguably sanctioned
the use of appeal waivers in plea agreements by giving “the green
light” for widespread use of such waivers. 94 Today, prosecutors
frequently include appeal waivers in guilty pleas, and many
public defenders fight tooth and nail to refuse the waiver unless
the client receives a heavy concession. 95 Still, the popularity of
appeal waivers cannot be denied and their effects on sentencing
have a heavy influence on sentencing policy in our justice
system. 96
C. Plain Error Review: Affecting Substantial Rights
The contemporaneous objection rule demands that the
defendant object at the trial level to preserve his argument for
appeal. 97 Under this requirement, if the defendant “fail[s] to
make timely assertion of the right,” he forfeits the ability to make
that argument on appeal. 98 The purpose of the rule is to allow the
court to correct errors on the record at the time they are made
93. See id. at 224 n.63 (citing H.R. DOC. NO. 106-55, at 13 (1999) (Conf.
Rep.)). The Advisory Committee on the Rules of Criminal Procedure believed it
was appropriate to recognize what was apparently already taking place in a
number of jurisdictions and to formally require trial judges in those jurisdictions
to question the defendant about whether his or her waiver was made knowingly,
voluntarily, and intelligently. Additional amendments were adopted by the
Court by order dated April 26, 1999, transmitted to Congress by the Chief
Justice on the same day (526 U.S. 1189; Cong. Rec., vol. 145, pt. 6, p. 7907, Ex.
Comm. 1788; H. Doc. 106–55), and became effective December 1, 1999. The
amendments affected Rules 6, 11, 24, and 54. Id.
94. See King & O’Neill, supra note 80, at 224 (“[W]hen the amendment
went into effect in 1999, it was the green light some prosecutors and judges had
been waiting for.”).
95. See id. at 233–34 nn.84–90 (describing the types of concessions public
defenders demand from prosecutors).
96. See discussion infra Part V (examining the policy consequences of
enforcing an appellate waiver despite the defendant’s lack of understanding
about its effects on his sentence).
97. See United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 15 (1985) (requiring the
defendant preserve his issue by timely objecting).
98. See Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 444 (1944) (providing for the
timely objection requirement).
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and to prevent “sandbagging.” 99 On appeal, a federal court may
consider a defendant’s unpreserved objection if the court finds
that the error at the trial level constituted “plain error.” 100 In
United States v. Olano, 101 the Court established a four-prong test
for plain error review. 102 First, there must be an error, which is
“[d]eviation from a legal rule . . . unless the rule has been
waived.” 103 Second, the error must also be “plain,” where “[p]lain
is synonymous with ‘clear’ or, equivalently, ‘obvious.’” 104 The third
limitation on review is that the error must “affect substantial
rights,” meaning “in most cases . . . that the error must have been
99. See DRESSLER, supra note 2, at 384. The rule aims to prevent the
defense tactic of “sandbagging,” in which
defense counsel could choose not to object to an error during the trial
and thereby achieve a no-lose situation: If the client was acquitted
despite the error, the Double Jeopardy Clause would assure that he
could not be retried; if the client was convicted, he could raise the
error on appeal to gain a new trial.
Id. The implications from sandbagging run further afoul in appellate review of
unpreserved errors because without plain error review, the presumption is
always on the government to prove there was no prejudice. See United States v.
Vonn, 535 U.S. 55, 73 (2002)
[A] defendant could choose to say nothing about a judge’s plain lapse
under Rule 11 until the moment of taking a direct appeal, at which
time the burden would always fall on the Government to prove
harmlessness. A defendant could simply relax and wait to see if the
sentence later struck him as satisfactory; if not, his Rule 11 silence
would have left him with clear but uncorrected Rule 11 error to place
on the Government’s shoulders.
100. FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(b). Rule 52(b) governs unpreserved errors on appeal;
it states that “[p]lain errors or defects affecting substantial rights may be
noticed although they were not brought to the attention of the court.”
101. 507 U.S. 725 (1993). In Olano, the Court stated that Rule 24(c) was
meant to protect the intrusion principle, which is that a jury’s deliberations
should be conducted in secrecy to prevent any outside influence on its decision.
Id. at 738. There was insufficient evidence for the Court to find that the
presence of the alternate jurors prejudiced the defendant’s outcome under Rule
24(c) and the intrusion doctrine. Id. at 739. The Court determined that,
although the presence of alternate jurors during jury deliberations was a
deviation from Rule 24(c), the defendant did not meet his burden of
demonstrating that the error affected his substantial rights under the fourprong test. Id. at 741.
102. See id. 736–37 (summarizing the purpose of the four-prong test).
103. Id. at 732–33.
104. Id. at 734.
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prejudicial: It must have affected the outcome of the district court
proceedings.” 105 Finally, the “court of appeals should correct a
plain forfeited error affecting substantial rights if the error
seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of
judicial proceedings.” 106 Much of the Court’s jurisprudence
involving the Olano test for plain error focuses on the third prong
of “affecting substantial rights” because this step requires the
defendant to bear the burden of showing why he was prejudiced
by the error. 107 In United States v. Vonn, 108 the Court applied the
105. Id.
106. Id. at 736 (internal quotation marks omitted). The fourth prong
illuminates the permissive, not mandatory, nature of plain error. A court may
correct plain error if it satisfies the test, but it is not required to do so. See id. at
736–37 (noting that while “[a]n error may seriously affect the fairness, integrity
or public reputation of judicial proceedings independent of the defendant’s
innocence,” a court retains discretion over correcting the error on appeal
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
107. See id. at 735 (“Normally, although perhaps not in every case, the
defendant must make a specific showing of prejudice to satisfy the ‘affecting
substantial rights’ prong of Rule 52(b).”). The Court noted that “[i]t is the
defendant rather than the Government who bears the burden of persuasion with
respect to prejudice. In most cases, a court of appeals cannot correct the
forfeited error unless the defendant shows that the error was prejudicial.” Id. at
734. The Court compared the burden shifting to the standard of harmless error
under Rule 52(a), which applies when the defendant preserved the error
through timely objection. See id. at 734 (“When the defendant has made a timely
objection to an error and Rule 52(a) applies, a court of appeals normally engages
in a specific analysis of the district court record—a so-called ‘harmless error’
inquiry—to determine whether the error was prejudicial.”).
108. See United States v. Vonn, 535 U.S. 55, 66 (2002) (ruling that Rule 11
errors are subject to review under the plain error standard articulated in Olano
and under Rule 52(b)). In Vonn, the defendant did not object at the guilty plea
hearing when the judge failed to advise him that he had a right to an attorney if
he chose to go to trial, violating Rule 11. Id. at 60. On appeal from his guilty
plea, the defendant asked the court to set aside his convictions. Id. at 61. Rule
11(h) states that “any variance from the procedures required by this rule which
does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded.” FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(h).
The Court determined that while Rule 11(h) echoed the Rule 52(a) standard for
harmless error, the fact that Congress did not give Rule 11(h) a counterpart
similar to that of Rule 52(b) did not implicate that Rule 11 was not subject to
plain error review. Vonn, 535 U.S. at 66. Additionally, the Court ruled that
when conducting plain error review, an appellate court may examine the entire
record to determine whether the error affected the defendant’s substantial
rights. Id. at 74. There was evidence on the record that Vonn affirmed in at least
two other proceedings that he understood his rights and even signed a
statement admitting as much, satisfying the Court that the defendant
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four-prong test for plain error to Rule 11 error when the
defendant or his counsel did not object at the hearing. 109 Vonn
confirmed that plain error review under Olano and Rule 52(b)
applied to Rule 11 errors in general; 110 still, it left unanswered
questions about prejudice and substantial rights in the Rule 11
context of appeal of guilty pleas with appellate waivers.
D. United States v. Dominguez Benitez: Rule 11 and the Objective
Test
In United States v. Dominguez Benitez, 111 the Court
attempted to confront the issues left open in Vonn about plain
error review of unpreserved Rule 11 violations. 112 In Dominguez
Benitez, the defendant entered a plea deal in which he pleaded
guilty to conspiracy to possess more than 500 grams of
methamphetamine, and the government dismissed a charge for
possession of methamphetamine. 113 The parties also agreed that
Dominguez would receive a safety valve reduction in sentencing,
which authorized a sentence below the statutory minimum. 114 For
the court to give the defendant the safety valve reduction, the
judge had to find that the defendant satisfied five factors
regarding the defendant and his history. 115 The agreement
further stated that the trial court was not bound to the plea
understood his right to counsel at trial. Id. at 75.
109. See Vonn, 535 U.S. at 66 (applying the four-prong plain error review
standard to determine that the defendant was not prejudiced by the Rule 11
error).
110. See id. at 63 (rejecting the defendant’s argument that plain error
review is inapplicable to Rule 11 errors because Congress did not intend to
eliminate the contemporaneous objection requirement).
111. 542 U.S. 74 (2004).
112. See id. at 81–82 (performing the objective analysis under the
reasonable probability standard and concluding that the defendant would not
have changed his guilty plea had the court advised him on the record that it did
not have to adhere to the sentencing guidelines).
113. Id. at 77; see also supra note 2 and accompanying text (providing
background on the types of charges and sentencing bargaining frequently used
by both parties to accomplish a plea deal).
114. Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. at 77.
115. Id. at 78.
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deal. 116 Without the safety valve reduction, Dominguez faced a
mandatory minimum sentence of ten years and a maximum
sentence of life in prison. 117 At the guilty plea hearing, the trial
court gave all of the Rule 11 advisements except it failed to advise
the defendant under Rule 11(c)(3)(B) that he could not withdraw
his plea if the court did not accept the government’s sentencing
recommendation. 118 The defendant did not make a timely Rule 11
objection to the colloquy error. 119
When the probation officer reviewed the presentence report,
it revealed that Dominguez had not disclosed all of his convictions
and was subsequently ineligible for the safety valve reduction in
sentencing. 120 The trial court sentenced the defendant to the
mandatory minimum of ten years. 121 Dominguez appealed and
argued that, under Vonn, the Rule 11 error affected his
substantial rights. 122 The Ninth Circuit required Dominguez to
“prove that the court’s error was not minor or technical and that
he did not understand the rights at issue when he entered his
guilty plea.” 123 The circuit court considered Dominguez’s inability
to speak English and the assurances of both the prosecutor and
his own counsel that he would probably receive the safety-valve
reduction as persuasive evidence that the defendant’s substantial
rights were affected. 124
On appeal, the Supreme Court considered the narrow
question of “what showing must thus be made to obtain relief for
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 76; see FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(3)(B) (“To the extent the plea
agreement is of the type specified in Rule 11(c)(1)(B), the court must advise the
defendant that the defendant has no right to withdraw the plea if the court does
not follow the recommendation or request.”); see also United States v. Booker,
543 U.S. 220, 259 (2005) (ruling that the Federal Sentencing Guidelines are not
mandatory and a judge is not required to follow them for sentencing).
119. United States v. Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. 74, 78 (2004).
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 79.
123. Id. (quoting United States v. Benitez, 310 F.3d 1221, 1225 (9th Cir.
2002)).
124. Id.
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an unpreserved Rule 11 failing.” 125 In response, the Court held
that a “defendant who seeks reversal of his conviction after a
guilty plea, on the ground that the district court committed plain
error under Rule 11, must show a reasonable probability that, but
for the error, he would not have entered the plea.” 126 Under the
plain error relief rule, “a defendant must thus satisfy the
judgment of the reviewing court, informed by the entire record,
that the probability of a different result is sufficient to undermine
confidence in the outcome of the proceeding.” 127 This showing
satisfied the requirement that the defendant prove that the Rule
11 error affected his substantial rights by demonstrating that the
error was prejudicial to the outcome of his case. 128 The Court
determined that the trial court’s Rule 11 error did not affect the
outcome because the written plea agreement warned the
defendant that he could not withdraw his plea if the court refused
the government’s recommendation, the defendant signed the
written agreement, and there was evidence the court informed
the defendant at least twice of his right to counsel at trial. 129 The
Court noted, however, that
when the record of a criminal conviction obtained by guilty
plea contains no evidence that a defendant knew of the rights
he was putatively waiving, the conviction must be reversed.
Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969). We do not suggest
that such a conviction could be saved even by overwhelming
evidence that the defendant would have pleaded guilty
regardless. 130

While this ruling stated the standard of review for a procedural
claim of error under Rule 11, Footnote 10 opened the door to an
appeal based on Boykin. In light of Footnote 10, a defendant could
argue that he entered his guilty plea involuntarily and

125. Id. at 76.
126. Id. at 83.
127. Id. (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).
128. Id. at 81–82.
129. Id. at 85.
130. See id. at 84 n.10 (acknowledging the voluntariness and intelligence
requirements for a defendant entering a guilty plea).
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unintelligently because of a deviation from a Rule 11 advisement
about the rights he waived.
IV. Federal Courts of Appeals’ Application of Dominguez Benitez
to Rule 11(b)(1)(N) Errors: Where the Confusion Arises
Rule 11 has broad implications as a constitutional and
procedural safeguard because its requirements span from
advising the defendant that he is waiving constitutional rights 131
to ensuring that he comprehends the role of statutory
sentencing. 132 Since the Supreme Court decided Dominguez
Benitez, the federal circuit courts have not consistently
established how the plain error review of a Rule 11(b)(1)(N) 133
error fits with the requirement that the defendant intelligently
and voluntarily entered the guilty plea. 134 Under Olano 135 and
Vonn, 136 all of the federal circuit courts are bound to apply the
reasonable probability standard for plain error review of Rule 11
131. The judge must advise the defendant of the waiver of constitutional
rights upon entering a guilty plea. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(1)(C) (providing
waiver of right to a jury trial); FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(1)(E) (detailing waiver of
right against compelled self-incrimination); FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(1)(E)
(presenting waiver of right to confront witnesses); discussion supra Part II.B
(examining the role of Rule 11 as a procedural safeguard).
132. The judge must advise the defendant of certain sentencing
requirements, including mandatory minimum and possible maximums. See FED.
R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(1)(H) (advising the defendant of the maximum possible
penalty); FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(1)(I) (advising the defendant of the mandatory
minimum penalty).
133. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(1)(N) (requiring that “[b]efore the court
accepts a plea of guilty . . . , the court must address the defendant personally in
open court,” and further “inform the defendant of, and determine that the
defendant understands . . . the terms of any plea-agreement provision waiving
the right to appeal or to collaterally attack the sentence”).
134. See Tellado v. United States, 799 F. Supp. 2d 156, 175 (D. Conn. 2011)
(“[I]t appears that there is no consensus about how the Rule 11 plain error
inquiry interacts with the requirement that a waiver of appeal or collateral
attack rights be knowing and voluntary in the context of challenges under Rule
11(b)(1)(N).”), aff’d, 745 F.3d 48 (2d Cir. 2014).
135. See supra notes 101–107 and accompanying text (discussing Olano and
the four-prong test for plain error review).
136. See supra notes 108–110 and accompanying text (applying plain error
review to Rule 11 error in Vonn).
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violations, 137 which the Court further developed in Dominguez
Benitez. 138
A split of authority among the U.S. courts of appeals arises
because some reference only the reasonable probability standard
in the substantial rights analysis of plain error review of Rule
11(b)(1)(N) errors. 139 Other circuits conduct a voluntariness and
intelligence inquiry that either stands alone as the only standard
of review or functions in addition to the objective examination. 140
Consequently, the type of Rule 11 error at issue appears to be a
distinguishing factor for plain error review because, as some
circuit courts argue, it may make the Dominguez Benitez
objective standard insufficient for Rule 11(b)(1)(N) error
review. 141 These circuits reason that Rule 11(b)(1)(N) violations
137. See United States v. Vonn, 535 U.S. 55, 66 (2002) (ruling that plain
error review is applicable for Rule 11 errors and that the defendant bears the
burden of showing that prejudice resulted from the judge’s error); United States
v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732 (1993) (stating the four-part test for review of plain
error).
138. See United States v. Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. 74, 83 (2004)
We hold, therefore, that a defendant who seeks reversal of his
conviction after a guilty plea, on the ground that the district court
committed plain error under Rule 11, must show a reasonable
probability that, but for the error, he would not have entered the plea.
A defendant must thus satisfy the judgment of the reviewing court,
informed by the entire record, that the probability of a different result
is “sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome” of the
proceeding.
(quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 669 (1984)); discussion supra
Part III.D (detailing the objective standard for plain error review articulated in
Dominguez Benitez).
139. See, e.g., United States v. Oliver, 630 F.3d 397, 412 (5th Cir. 2011)
(“[T]o justify reversal for a district court’s error in a Rule 11 admonishment, the
defendant ‘must show a reasonable probability that, but for the error, he would
not have entered the plea.’” (citing Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. at 83)).
140. See discussion infra Parts IV.B–C (analyzing federal circuit courts’
implied or express applications of a voluntary and intelligence inquiry for
review of Rule 11(b)(1)(N) errors); see, e.g., United States v. Goodson, 544 F.3d
529, 540 (3d Cir. 2008)
Our inquiry is not limited, however, to whether there was a technical
violation of Rule 11. Rather, we must determine whether . . . the
deficient colloquy affected [the defendant’s] substantial rights by
precluding him from knowing of and understanding the significance
of the binding appellate waiver in the plea agreement.
141. See, e.g., Tellado v. United States, 799 F. Supp. 2d 156, 175 (D. Conn.
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are distinguishable from other Rule 11 errors because enforcing
an appellate waiver based upon a record that does not establish
the voluntariness and intelligence of a guilty plea defeats the
purpose of Rule 11. 142 The circuit split ultimately hinges on
different inquiries: whether the defendant would have pleaded
guilty if the judge had not erred during the colloquy or whether
the defendant understood that he waived the right to appeal. 143
Including an intelligence inquiry alongside or instead of the
reasonable probability standard for plain error review of a Rule
11(b)(1)(N) error is a divisive issue among the circuits that
creates a variance in outcomes when a court must determine the
enforceability of an appellate waiver. 144
2011) (distinguishing Dominguez Benitez by noting that there are “reasons to
believe that application of the Rule 11 plain error standard to alleged violations
of Rule 11(b)(1)(N) might not be straightforward”), aff’d, 745 F.3d 48 (2d Cir.
2014). The scope of this Note focuses on the interaction between the voluntary
and intelligent requirement and Rule 11(b)(1)(N) violations. The argument that
Dominguez Benitez is distinguishable from Rule 11(b)(1)(N) errors does not
extend to the extreme conclusion that Dominguez Benitez is only applicable to
Rule 11(c)(3)(B) errors. See discussion infra Part V (elaborating on why Rule
11(b)(1)(N) errors are distinguishable from other types of Rule 11 errors).
142. See United States v. Sura, 511 F.3d 654, 660 (7th Cir. 2007) (“[The
defendant] must show that his guilty plea was involuntary and that he would
not have entered it on the basis of the record as a whole . . . .”).
143. See discussion infra Parts IV.B, IV.C (comparing the roots of the
different inquiries).
144. See discussion infra Part IV.C (demonstrating the disparity in
enforcing appellate waivers when courts adopt the secondary voluntary and
intelligence inquiry). The Tenth, Eleventh, and Federal Circuits have not issued
binding opinions on review of Rule 11(b)(1)(N) errors after Dominguez Benitez.
See infra Part V (presenting the recent decisions in the Tenth Circuit that
reflect disagreement about review of appellate waiver and noting that the Tenth
Circuit affirms the use of appellate waiver in general). In 2004, the Ninth
Circuit amended its 2003 opinion from United States v. Arellano-Gallegos. 387
F.3d 794 (2004). For the purposes of the circuit discussion in this Note, the
Ninth Circuit has not issued a sufficient number of opinions to facilitate an
independent discussion. See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 389 F.3d 944, 953 (9th
Cir. 2004) (noting the court “review[s] de novo the question of whether an
appellant has waived his right to appeal” and finding the appellate waiver
enforceable (citing United States v. Shimoda, 334 F.3d 846, 848 (9th Cir. 2003));
United States v. Alarid, 123 Fed. App’x 294, 295 (9th Cir. 2005) (concluding that
the defendant’s waiver was unenforceable after de novo review of the record
because the trial court “failed to discuss the specific terms of the waiver and
ensure Alarid’s understanding as required by Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(1)(N)”). The
lack of Ninth Circuit case law on this narrow issue should not undercut the
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The Fifth Circuit alone is faithful to strict application of the
reasonable probability standard from Dominguez Benitez when
determining the enforceability of an appellate waiver. 145 While
the Fifth Circuit may engage in a limited fact-specific analysis, it
systematically evaluates the substance of the plea colloquy only
to the extent that is required to confirm that the petitioner’s
substantial rights were not violated. 146 In various appeals, the
court found that sufficient evidence for this level of inquiry
included that the defendant read the agreement, stated he
understood the agreement, and signed the agreement. 147 If there
is sufficient evidence on the record that the defendant would not
have pleaded guilty but for the error, the court does not inquire
into the voluntariness and intelligence of the plea. 148 The Fifth
guidance in Arellano-Gallegos, which merits attention from other circuits for its
analysis of the defendant’s substantial rights. See infra note 230 (discussing the
value of the Arellano-Gallegos voluntariness and intelligence inquiry). This Note
discusses the Ninth Circuit’s decision as other circuits reference it in their
opinions.
145. See United States v. Oliver, 630 F.3d 397, 412 (5th Cir. 2011)
(“Moreover, to justify reversal for a district court’s error in a Rule 11
admonishment, the defendant ‘must show a reasonable probability that, but for
the error, he would not have entered the plea.’” (quoting United States v.
Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. 74, 83 (2004))); see also United States v.
Alvarado-Casas, 715 F.3d 945, 955 (5th Cir. 2013) (ruling that it is sufficient
under Rule 11 for the trial court to review the plea agreement with the
defendant and confirm his voluntary signature).
146. See United States v. Narvaez, 452 Fed. App’x 488, 493 (5th Cir. 2011)
(per curiam) (unpublished) (“Taken together, the questions asked and
information provided are sufficient for us to conclude that Narvaez has not
shown that his substantial rights were violated.”); id. at 493 n.5 (noting that
had the petitioner raised an involuntariness claim, “such an argument would
ring hollow” in light of the defendant’s graduate degree and effective counsel).
147. See, e.g., United States v. Tydus, 574 Fed. App’x 294, 295 (5th Cir.
2014) (per curiam) (unpublished) (“[The defendant] demonstrated at the
re-arraignment hearing that he had read and understood the plea agreement,
which included the appeal waiver, and raised no question regarding that
provision; therefore, the waiver is valid.”); Oliver, 630 F.3d at 412 (concluding
that, although the judge did not clarify the context of the appeal waiver under
the “limited circumstances” in the plea agreement, the colloquy was adequate
because the defendant indicated he understood and had opportunity to inquire
further about the provisions in the paragraphs).
148. See Narvaez, 452 Fed. App’x at 492–93 (rejecting petitioner’s claim

EXAMINING RULE 11(B)(1)(N) ERROR

579

Circuit’s approach to Rule 11(b)(1)(N) plain error review is
therefore the prototype of the pure harmless error standard
articulated in Dominguez Benitez because it applies solely the
objective standard. 149
B. Circuits that Claim to Apply Only the Objective Test
The First, Fourth, and Eighth Circuits claim to apply only
the Dominguez Benitez reasonable probability test to all Rule 11
violations, including Rule 11(b)(1)(N) errors on appeal from a
guilty plea. 150 However, these circuits frequently include a
voluntariness and intelligence inquiry under the guise of the
procedural analysis that Dominguez Benitez requires. 151
In United States v. Borrero-Acevedo, 152 the First Circuit
determined in a case of first impression that the Dominguez
Benitez standard for Rule 11 plain error review was directly
applicable to Rule 11(b)(1)(N) errors. 153 The court declined to
analyze the voluntary and intelligent nature of the plea and
because it “rests solely upon the district court’s alleged failure to sufficiently
ensure that his waiver was informed and voluntary during the plea colloquy”).
The court noted that when a defendant “claims that he was misled or coerced
into entering the [plea] agreement, or that he was incompetent when he signed
the waiver, [he] challenges the validity of the waiver itself, not the Rule 11
colloquy.” Id. at 491 n.3 (citing United States v. Goodson, 544 F.3d 529, 540 n.9
(3d. Cir. 2008)). The distinction in the Fifth Circuit is that the Fifth Circuit does
not identify a Rule 11(b)(1)(N) error as constituting grounds to challenge the
validity of the waiver. Id. (rejecting the defendant’s voluntariness and
intelligence argument because Rule 11(b)(1)(N) error was subject to plain error
review).
149. See Oliver, 630 F.3d at 412 (stating the Dominguez Benitez standard).
150. See infra notes 153, 167, 175 and accompanying text (adopting the
Dominguez Benitez standard for demonstrating prejudice).
151. See infra notes 154, 170, 178 and accompanying text (elaborating on the
voluntariness and intelligence inquiry).
152. 533 F.3d 11 (1st Cir. 2008).
153. See id. at 13 (“We apply, for the first time, the Supreme Court’s recent
plain error decisions to a defendant’s unpreserved claim of Rule 11(b)(1)(N)
error as to a waiver of appeal clause at the change-of-plea hearing.”); id. at 18
(“It is defendant’s burden to show that the waiver of appellate rights was
deficient and that he would otherwise not have pled guilty. If the record
contains no evidence in defendant’s favor, his claim fails.” (citing United States
v. Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. 74, 82 (2004))).
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stated that “[i]t is not enough to ask whether the defendant
understood the rights at issue when he entered his guilty plea;
courts must consider the effect of an omitted warning on the
defendant’s decision to plead guilty.” 154 Relevant factors to
whether the defendant’s substantial rights were affected included
“the clarity of the plea agreement itself, defendant’s signature on
the agreement and his attestations, defendant’s statements at the
change-of-plea hearing, statements by counsel for both the
defendant and the government at the hearing, and the nature of
the questioning done by the judge at the hearing.” 155 The First
Circuit importantly attempted to distinguish its ruling from cases
in the Sixth156 and Ninth 157 Circuits by noting that those circuits’
interpretations were inconsistent with Vonn and Dominguez
Benitez. 158 Although the court stated its position clearly, it also
strived to distinguish the facts of Borrero-Acevedo from the facts
of United States v. Sura. 159 In Sura, the Seventh Circuit fell on
the opposite side of the question of applying Dominguez Benitez to
Rule 11(b)(1)(N) errors. 160 When describing the factual variances
154. See id. at 16 (echoing the reasonable probability standard).
155. See id. at 17 (relying on these factors to determine prejudice to the
defendant).
156. See United States v. Murdock, 398 F.3d 491 (6th Cir. 2005) (declining to
enforce the defendant’s appellate waiver after a Rule 11(b)(1)(N) error because
the record did not demonstrate that he voluntarily and intelligently entered the
plea agreement); infra notes 209–218 and accompanying text (discussing the
precedential value of Murdock for plain error review of Rule 11(b)(1)(N)
violations).
157. See United States v. Arellano-Gallegos, 387 F.3d 794, 797 (9th Cir.
2004) (establishing the Ninth Circuit’s approach to plain error review of Rule
11(b)(1)(N) violations under the voluntariness and intelligence inquiry); see also
infra note 230 (describing the importance of the Ninth Circuit’s ruling).
158. See United States v. Borrero-Acevedo, 533 F.3d 11, 18 (1st Cir. 2008)
Some courts have held that where there is no discussion of an
appellate waiver clause at the plea hearing and there is an absence of
“any indication on the record that the defendant understood that he
had a right to appeal and he was giving up that right,” that will
suffice to satisfy the third prong of the plain error test. This view is,
we think, inconsistent with both Vonn and Dominguez Benitez.
(citing Murdock, 398 F.3d at 497; Arellano-Gallegos, 387 F.3d at 797).
159. 511 F.3d 654 (7th Cir. 2007).
160. See discussion infra notes 223–229 and accompanying text (discussing
the Seventh Circuit’s adoption of the voluntariness and intelligence inquiry as
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between the cases, 161 the court noted that “Borrero has not shown
that he did not know or understand that he had waived his
appellate rights or that he would not have pled guilty had he
realized he was waiving his appellate rights.” 162 This statement
illuminates, unintentionally on the court’s part, the judicial
instinct to engage in the two-part inquiry, even upon express
rejection of such an analysis a paragraph earlier. 163 The First
Circuit reiterated the position that the Dominguez Benitez
standard applies directly to Rule 11(b)(1)(N) errors in United
States v. Sotirion. 164 But, in that case too, the court again blurred
the application of the reasonable probability test with a
voluntariness and intelligence inquiry for the procedural
violation under Rule 11(b)(1)(N). 165
complementary to the objective standard).
161. See Borrero-Acevedo, 533 F.3d at 18 (noting that the relevant factors in
Sura included the petitioner’s old age, diminished mental capacity, labored
responses to the court’s questions, and current treatment for mental illness, and
further stating that in the case of Borrero-Acevedo, “[n]othing of the sort exists
here”).
162. Id. (emphasis added).
163. See id. (rejecting the voluntary and intelligent analysis adopted in the
Sixth and Ninth Circuits).
164. See United States v. Sotirion, 617 F.3d 27, 34 (1st Cir. 2010) (describing
the holding in Borrero-Acevedo as establishing the reasonable probability
standard, which was not “by its terms restricted to particular types of Rule 11
errors”).
165. See id. at 34 (“[T]o establish that the Rule 11(b)(1)(N) error affected his
substantial rights under the third prong of the plain error test, the defendant
must show a reasonable probability that he would not have entered the plea had
the error not been made.” (internal citation and quotation marks omitted)). The
court attempted to clarify that the defendant can make a voluntary and
intelligent claim outside of raising a Rule 11(b)(1)(N) violation on appeal under
constitutional principles. See id. at 33 (“First, we require that the defendant
enter into the waiver ‘knowingly and voluntarily.’”); id. at 34 n.6 (“Plain error
review would not apply if the defendant challenged the knowing and voluntary
nature of his appellate waiver on grounds independent of the district court’s
compliance with Rule 11(b)(1)(N).”). The court noted, however, that during the
Rule 11-required colloquy, “the court’s inquiry ‘should be specific enough to
confirm the defendant’s understanding of the waiver and [his] acquiescence in
the relinquishment of rights that it betokens.’” Id. at 35 (quoting United States
v. Teeter, 257 F.3d 14, 24 n.7 (1st Cir. 2001)). This statement tends to support
the two-part inquiry that the First Circuit claimed to reject because it melds the
voluntariness and intelligence inquiry from Boykin with the objective analysis of
Dominguez Benitez.
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Most recently, the Fourth Circuit emphasized its agreement
with the First Circuit by applying the reasonable probability test
to Rule 11(b)(1)(N) error in United States v. Murraye. 166 Citing
the rule from Dominguez Benitez, the court found that the
appellant had not satisfied his burden of establishing that the
Rule 11(b)(1)(N) error affected his substantial rights. 167 Still, the
court ruled that, based on the appellant’s limited education and
the court’s failure to ensure the defendant’s understanding of the
plea, the waiver was unenforceable because it was not voluntary
and intelligent. 168 Although intended to take place outside of the
scope of the plain error review, 169 the court’s voluntariness and
166. See United States v. Murraye, 596 Fed. App’x 219, 220 (4th Cir. 2015)
(per curiam) (unpublished) (concluding that the defendant did not meet the
required showing under Dominguez Benitez, but still denying the Government’s
motion to dismiss the appeal because the appellate waiver was not voluntary
and intelligent).
167. See id. at 227 (“Appellant bears the final burden of showing that the
plain error in this case affected his substantial rights.”). The court emphasized
that there were “no statements on the record, at any stage of the trial
proceedings, demonstrating that Appellant wished to withdraw his guilty plea
or would have gone to trial but for the errors.” Id. at 228; see also United States
v. Martinez, 277 F.3d 517, 531 (4th Cir. 2002) (requiring the defendant to
“demonstrate that, absent the Rule 11 errors, he would not have entered into his
plea agreement with the Government”).
168. See Murraye, 596 Fed. App’x at 227 (“We must evaluate this issue by
reference to the totality of the circumstances, including the experience and
conduct of the accused, as well as the accused’s educational background and
familiarity with the terms of the plea agreement.” (internal quotation marks
omitted) (citing United States v. General, 278 F.3d 389, 400 (4th Cir. 2002))).
The court specifically noted the defendant’s “limited educational background
and . . . enroll[ment] in special education classes” in its analysis of the
circumstances. Id.
169. See id. (indicating the totality of the circumstances standard). The
court’s use of the “totality of the circumstances” context suggests that the
voluntariness and intelligence inquiry could have been on constitutional
grounds instead of procedural. See id. (separating the analysis of Rule 11 errors
under the reasonable probability standard from the discussion of the
Government’s motion to dismiss based on the enforceability of the appellate
waiver); see also United States v. Manigan, 592 F.3d 621, 627 (4th Cir. 2010)
(“Whether a defendant knowingly and intelligently agreed to waive his right of
appeal must be evaluated by reference to the totality of the circumstances.”
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); discussion supra Part II.A
(discussing Boykin v. Alabama, which allows a defendant to raise the argument
that his plea was neither voluntary nor intelligent on constitutional grounds,
independent of procedural error).
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intelligence inquiry occurred under the Rule 11(b)(1)(N)
review. 170 The court unified the constitutional and procedural
inquiries when it stated that “[a]n appellate waiver is not
knowingly or voluntarily made if the district court fails to
specifically question the defendant concerning the waiver
provision of the plea agreement during the Rule 11 colloquy and
the record indicates that the defendant did not otherwise
understand the full significance of the waiver.” 171 Because the
court refused to enforce the waiver given the evidence of the
defendant’s delayed mental development, it based its decision to
overturn the conviction on the defendant’s understanding of the
plea, not the probability of whether the defendant would have
pleaded differently but for the error. 172 Before Murraye, the
Fourth Circuit inconsistently approached Rule 11(b)(1)(N)
violations by claiming to apply the objective test, but then
analyzing the totality of the circumstances to determine whether
the record established that the defendant entered the appellate
waiver voluntarily and intelligently. 173
170. See Murraye, 596 Fed. App’x at 229 (“The district court also never
asked specifically whether Appellant understood the waiver of his appeal rights.
Considering the totality of the circumstances, we conclude Appellant’s waiver
was neither knowing nor intelligent.” (citing Manigan, 592 F.3d at 627)). By
including the failure to inquire about appellate waiver as a factor of the totality
of the circumstances, the court blends the constitutional and procedural
inquiries to conclude that the waiver is unenforceable. See id. at 223 (noting the
absence of colloquy about the waiver).
171. See id. at 229 (citing Manigan, 592 U.S. at 627) (demonstrating the
court’s reliance on determining whether the defendant actually understood the
appellate waiver, as opposed to looking at evidence of whether he would have
pleaded differently but for the errors).
172. See id. at 227–29 (ruling that although the defendant did not satisfy
the Dominguez Benitez showing of a reasonable probability that he would have
pleaded differently but for the error, the appeal waiver was unenforceable
because it was not voluntary and intelligently made).
173. See Manigan, 592 F.3d at 627 (“[A] waiver is not knowingly or
voluntarily made if the district court fails to specifically question the defendant
concerning the waiver provision of the plea agreement during the Rule 11
colloquy and the record indicates that the defendant did not otherwise
understand the full significance of the waiver.” (internal citation and quotation
marks omitted)). The court noted that “[w]hether a defendant knowingly and
intelligently agreed to waive his right of appeal must be evaluated by reference
to the totality of the circumstances” and that “[a]n important factor in such an
evaluation is whether the district court sufficiently explained the waiver to the
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In United States v. Frook, 174 the Eighth Circuit engaged in
analysis similar to that of the First and Fourth Circuits’ analyses
by stating that Dominguez Benitez controls the plain error review
standard with the objective reasonable probability test. 175 But the
court further engaged in fact-specific inquiry that implicated
voluntary and intelligence constitutional grounds. 176 Even as the
court ruled to uphold the appellate waiver, 177 it cautioned that
defendant during the Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 plea colloquy.” Id.
Compare United States v. Dickerson, 410 Fed. App’x 635, 638 (4th Cir. 2011)
(per curiam) (unpublished) (upholding the appellate waiver because there was
insufficient evidence that the defendant would have pleaded differently had the
judge not erred during the Rule 11 hearing, but still conducting a factual review
of the “totality of the circumstances”), with United States v. Johnson, 368 Fed.
App’x 419, 421–22 (4th Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (unpublished) (ruling that the
deficiencies in the Rule 11 colloquy were sufficient to make the defendant’s
appellate waiver unenforceable because it could not be considered voluntary and
intelligent).
174. 616 F.3d 773 (8th Cir. 2010).
175. Compare id. at 775 (“[W]hen a defendant pleads guilty without proper
advice under Rule 11, he may appeal the conviction under at least a plain error
standard, with relief potentially available where the defendant can show a
reasonable probability that, but for the error, he would not have entered the
plea.” (emphasis added) (citing United States v. Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S.
74, 83 (2004))), with id. (“[W]e see no good reason to treat alleged violations of
Rule 11(b)(1)—concerning advise [sic] and questioning of the defendant—
differently from alleged violations of Rule 11(b)(3)—concerning adequacy of a
factual basis—when considering the availability of appellate review.”).
176. See id. at 777 (describing the colloquy that took place at the plea
hearing and other circumstances, including the defendant’s education). This
analysis of “other circumstances” that were on the record but that were not
reflective of the Rule 11(b)(1)(N) error itself indicates the blending of the
objective plain error analysis with constitutional grounds for appeal under
Boykin. See also United States v. Sotirion, 617 F.3d 27, 34 n.6 (1st Cir. 2010)
(“Plain error review would not apply if the defendant challenged the knowing
and voluntary nature of his appellate waiver on grounds independent of the
district court’s compliance with Rule 11(b)(1)(N) . . . .”); United States v.
Goodson, 544 F.3d 529, 539 n.9 (3d Cir. 2008) (“[A] defendant who claims that
he was misled or coerced into entering the agreement, or that he was
incompetent when he signed the waiver, challenges the validity of the waiver
itself, not the Rule 11 colloquy. Such a challenge would receive de novo
review . . . .”).
177. See Frook, 616 F.3d at 777 (“[The defendant] has not demonstrated that
the district court’s failure to advise him of terms in the plea agreement waiving
the right to appeal, as required by Rule 11(b)(1)(N), affected his decision to
plead guilty.”). The court examined the defendant’s claim that the district court
“bullied” him with its “colorful banter” regarding the apparent “tension between
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“Rule 11 is meant to ensure that a guilty plea is knowing and
voluntary, and the district court must follow a certain protocol
designed to achieve that end.” 178 Among the U.S. courts of
appeals that claim to not conduct a complementary voluntariness
and intelligence inquiry upon a Rule 11(b)(1)(N) violation, the
Eighth Circuit presides as the court that consistently delves
deeply into such an inquiry. 179 The muddling of the voluntary and
intelligent requirement with plain error review of the Rule
11(b)(1)(N) procedural error reflects both the complexity of Rule
11 as a safeguard for appellate waiver and the obscurity of the
rationale Dominguez Benitez as courts attempt to apply its
objective standard to carefully guarded appellate rights. 180
In sum, the First, Fourth, and Eighth Circuits frequently
include a voluntariness and intelligence inquiry in the plain error
review of Rule 11(b)(1)(N) errors. 181 The inconsistent application
Frook’s extensive educational background and his asserted ignorance” about the
requisite intent for the charge to which he pleaded guilty. Id. at 776–77. Noting
that “the colloquy simply forced Frook to make a definitive statement about
whether or not he committed the offense,” the Eighth Circuit ruled that the
district court colloquy allowed the defendant “ample opportunity to refrain from
pleading guilty and to proceed to trial if he so desired.” Id. at 777.
178. Id. at 775 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted); see id. (“A
valid guilty plea that waives non-jurisdictional defects, in other words, must be
knowing and voluntary.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
179. The Eighth Circuit has endeavored to be aggressive in its non-explicit
evaluation of voluntariness and intelligence of appellate waiver. See, e.g., United
States v. Slaughter, 407 F. App’x 83, 83 (8th Cir. 2011) (per curiam)
(unpublished) (refusing to uphold appellate waiver because of the “minimal
discussion of the plea agreement and waiver at the plea hearing”); United States
v. Rojas-Coria, 401 F.3d 871, 872 n.2 (8th Cir. 2005) (ruling appellate waiver
unenforceable because of inadequate colloquy); see also United States v. Andis,
333 F.3d 886, 891 (8th Cir. 2003) (“[A] defendant may knowingly and
voluntarily enter into a plea agreement waiving the right to a jury trial, but
nonetheless fail to have knowingly and voluntarily waived other rights—
including appellate rights.”).
180. See United States v. Frook, 616 F.3d 773, 775 (8th Cir. 2010) (“[A]
district court’s failure to comply with Rule 11 calls into question the knowing
and voluntary nature of a plea, and thus its validity.”); see also Andis, 333 F.3d
at 891 (“[B]ecause . . . failure to make a determination as required under Fed. R.
Crim. P. 11(b)(1)(N)[] can create potential error, a district court should endeavor
to correctly address any waiver in a plea agreement and ascertain that a
defendant has knowingly and voluntarily waived the rights addressed by the
agreement.”).
181. See supra notes 161–163, 170–172, 178–179 and accompanying text
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of this secondary analysis alongside the Dominguez Benitez
harmless error standard results in unpredictable outcomes for
defendants appealing from guilty pleas. 182 Due to lacking case
law and confusion about how far Dominguez Benitez extends in
general to Rule 11 errors, these circuits claim to apply one
analysis while actually engaging in another. Their inclusion of
the secondary inquiry makes it evident that many courts find a
voluntariness and intelligence requirement at the core of Rule
11(b)(1)(N) error review. 183
C. Circuits that Apply a Voluntariness and Intelligence Inquiry
The federal circuit courts that use the additional
voluntariness and intelligence test for Rule 11(b)(1)(N) plain
error review are the Second, Third, Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth
Circuits. 184 These circuits add the examination into the
voluntariness and intelligence of a defendant’s appellate waiver
because Rule 11(b)(1)(N) errors are distinguishable from the Rule
11(c)(3)(B) 185 error in Dominguez Benitez. 186 Therefore, the
objective standard articulated in Dominguez Benitez is
insufficient alone to review the fundamental nature of an
appellate waiver. 187
(elaborating on the First, Fourth, and Eighth Circuits’ application of the two
tests upon plain error review of Rule 11(b)(1)(N) errors).
182. See discussion infra Part V (arguing that inconsistent review by the
circuits impacts the enforcement of the appellate waivers).
183. See discussion infra Part V (arguing that the voluntariness and
intelligence inquiry should be added alongside the Dominguez Benitez standard
because most of the circuits already engage in the analysis).
184. See discussion infra Part IV.C (describing the circuits that apply a
voluntary and intelligent inquiry to their Rule 11(b)(1)(N) plain error review).
185. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(3)(B) (“To the extent the plea agreement is of
the type specified in Rule 11(c)(1)(B), the court must advise the defendant that
the defendant has no right to withdraw the plea if the court does not follow the
recommendation or request.”).
186. See discussion supra Part III.D (presenting the Dominguez Benitez
standard that a defendant can only show that his substantial rights were
violated in a Rule 11(b)(1)(N) error if he can demonstrate that had the judge not
erred, he would not have pleaded guilty).
187. See discussion infra Part V (advocating for the adoption of the
voluntariness and intelligence inquiry).
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Most recently, the Second Circuit clearly established the twopart framework for a Rule 11(b)(1)(N) error in United States v.
Cook. 188 In Cook, the court initially stated that United States v.
Vonn 189 controls the plain error review standard for all Rule 11
errors including Rule 11(b)(1)(N). 190 However, the court further
determined that the standard under United States v. Ready 191
was not inconsistent with the Vonn requirements, even though
the standard under Ready probed the defendant’s understanding
of the guilty plea. 192 By embracing the Ready standard under the
prejudice prong of Vonn, the Second Circuit expressed favor of the
additional analysis regarding the defendant’s understanding of
appellate waiver. 193 In Cook, the court reviewed the plea hearing
colloquy and concluded that the colloquy was sufficient because
“under the circumstances, there was no realistic possibility that
188. See United States v. Cook, 722 F.3d 477, 482 (2d Cir. 2013) (concluding
that the defendant did not establish a “realistic possibility that [he] might have
misunderstood the nature or source of the waiver” (internal citation omitted)).
The court noted that the defendant “also fail[ed] to establish plain error for a
second, alternative reason: he has not shown a reasonable probability that, but
for the error, he would not have entered the plea.” Id. at 482–83 (internal
citation omitted).
189. 535 U.S. 55 (2002); see discussion supra Part III.C (establishing the
four-prong test for plain error review).
190. See Cook, 722 F.3d at 481 (“We are bound by Vonn, which governs all
Rule 11 appeals, subsection (b)(1)(N) included.”). The court reiterated the fourpart test for plain error and further noted that “[a]dditionally, to show that a
Rule 11 violation was plain error, the defendant must demonstrate that there is
a reasonable probability that, but for the error, he would not have entered the
plea.” Id.
191. 82 F.3d 551 (2d Cir. 1996).
192. See Cook, 722 F.3d at 481 (“In any event, Ready’s ‘knowing and
voluntary’ test is not at all inconsistent with plain error review: ‘Rule 11 is
designed to assist district courts in ensuring that a defendant’s guilty plea is
knowing and voluntary.’” (quoting United States v. Mercado, 349 F.3d 708, 711
(2d Cir. 2003))). The standard under Ready is whether “the record clearly
demonstrates that the waiver was both knowing (in the sense that the
defendant fully understood the potential consequences of his waiver) and
voluntary.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). Therefore, although Ready was
decided before Vonn, Ready’s query into the defendant’s understanding of the
guilty plea does not conflict with plain error review of Rule 11(b)(1)(N). See id.
(acknowledging that the two standards do not clash).
193. See id. at 482–83 (analyzing whether the defendant understood he
waived his right to appeal or collaterally attack his conviction upon a guilty
plea, except to appeal a sentence that exceeded sixty months).
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[the defendant] might have misunderstood the nature or source of
the waiver.” 194 Under this framework, the analysis hinged on
whether the defendant understood the appellate waiver, not
whether he showed a reasonable probability that, but for the
error, he would not have entered the plea. 195
In United States v. Goodson, 196 the Third Circuit noted that
the analysis of the Rule 11(b)(1)(N) error was not limited to
whether there was a technical violation, but also encompassed
the defendant’s understanding of the rights he waived in the
guilty plea. 197 The court stated that it could not “ignore that there
was no effort to verify that Goodson understood the breadth of
the waiver” and that such deficiency constituted error. 198
“[I]nquiry is not limited, however, to whether there was a
technical violation of Rule 11[,]” 199 and the panel continued its
analysis to determine whether the defendant had shown that he
did not understand the rights he waived by entering the guilty
plea. 200 The court pushed its review past the harmless error
194. See id. at 481–82 (stating that the defendant had not shown he would
not have entered the plea but for the error, yet continuing the analysis as a factspecific inquiry into the colloquy). Notably, the court did not reference
Dominguez Benitez in its opinion.
195. See id. at 481 (addressing the defendant’s complaint that “the judge
failed to advise him of the ‘heart’ of the appeal waiver”); see also Tellado v.
United States, 799 F. Supp. 2d 156, 175–78 (D. Conn. 2011) (conducting a
detailed survey of the U.S. appeals courts’ application of Dominguez Benitez to
Rule 11(b)(1)(N) errors and concluding that the Second Circuit would safely fall
within the circuits that elect to apply the voluntariness and intelligence
inquiry), aff’d, 745 F.3d 48 (2d Cir. 2014).
196. 544 F.3d 529 (3d Cir. 2008).
197. Id. at 540 (determining whether defendant understood the appeal
waiver, despite the insufficient colloquy).
198. See id. at 540 (discussing how the prosecutor’s description of the terms
of the plea agreement in open court was insufficient under Rule 11(b)(1)(N)
because the court should have asked the defendant “personally whether he
understood that he had given up substantial appellate rights . . . .”).
199. Id.
200. See id. (“[W]e must determine whether Goodson, who bears the burden
of persuasion, has demonstrated that the deficient colloquy affected his
substantial rights by precluding him from knowing of and understanding the
significance of the binding appellate waiver in the plea agreement.” (citing
United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734 (1993))). This statement adds the
objective standard under Dominguez Benitez to the voluntariness and
intelligence inquiry because the court expressly attempted to discern the
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review of Rule 11(b)(1)(N) and found that the defendant entered
the appellate waiver intelligently and knowingly by conducting a
fact-specific examination of the colloquy. 201
The Third Circuit faced a more deviant colloquy in United
States v. Corso, 202 in which the trial court’s failure to advise the
defendant about his appellate waiver affirmatively affected the
defendant’s substantial rights under plain error review. 203
Although the court restated the reasonable probability standard
as articulated in Dominguez Benitez, 204 it did not analyze
whether the defendant demonstrated that he would not have
entered the plea but for the Rule 11(b)(1)(N) error. 205 Instead, the
court engaged in a fact-specific inquiry based on evidence on the
record 206 that examined the defendant’s depth of understanding
defendant’s actual understanding of the appellate waiver in light of the Rule
11(b)(1)(N) error.
201. See id. at 540–41 (detailing the colloquy, which included discussion of
the limited circumstances under which the defendant could appeal, the
defendant’s acknowledgement of the contents of the plea agreement, and the
prosecutor’s statements about the appellate waiver). The court also noted the
defendant’s college education and that he successfully committed wire fraud,
which indicated the defendant possessed a high degree of sophistication and
intellect. Id.
202. 549 F.3d 921 (3d Cir. 2008).
203. See id. at 931 (finding that the “near-total deviation” from Rule
11(b)(1)(N)’s procedural requirements satisfied a showing of prejudice).
204. See id. at 929 (providing that, for a defendant to show his substantial
rights were affected, “a defendant who seeks reversal of his conviction after a
guilty plea, on the ground that the district court committed plain error under
Rule 11, must show a reasonable probability that, but for the error, he would
not have entered the plea” (quoting United States v. Dominguez Benitez, 542
U.S. 74, 83 (2004))).
205. See id. (explaining that the defendant “is obliged to show a reasonable
probability that the Rule 11 error ‘precluded him from understanding that he
had a right to appeal and that he had substantially agreed to give up that right’”
(quoting United States v. Goodson, 544 F.3d 529, 541 (3d Cir. 2008))). This
standard as stated in Corso conflates the Dominguez Benitez test with the
two-part analysis for voluntariness and intelligence, again indicating that the
inquiry is laden with misperception about the what the Supreme Court intended
the standard to be for Rule 11(b)(1)(N) errors given Footnote 10. See supra text
accompanying note 130 (citing United States v. Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. 74,
84 n.10 (2004)).
206. See Corso, 549 F.3d at 929 (“We may consult the entire record, and not
simply the record of the plea colloquy, when considering the effect of the Rule 11
error.” (citing United States v. Vonn, 535 U.S. 55, 59 (2002))).
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about the appellate waiver. 207 Notably, although the court
determined that the appellate waiver was still enforceable under
the fourth prong of plain error review, the court found that the
defendant carried his burden to show his substantial rights were
prejudiced under the third prong. 208
Following the Second and Third Circuits, the Sixth Circuit
determined that the defendant’s substantial rights were
prejudiced in United States v. Murdock209 because there was no
evidence that the defendant understood the role of the appellate
waiver in his guilty plea. 210 Turning to facts similar to those
relied upon by the Second and Third Circuits, 211 the Sixth Circuit
207. See id. at 930 (“[T]he point of Rule 11(b)(1)(N) is that a signed piece of
paper is not enough.” (quoting United States v. Sura, 511 F.3d 654, 662 (7th Cir.
2007))). The Third Circuit noted that in its previous ruling in Goodson, it
“addressed some of the considerations that inform our inquiry into whether an
inadequate Rule 11 colloquy affected a defendant’s substantial rights.” Id.
(citing United States v. Goodson, 544 F.3d 529, 541 (3d Cir. 2008)). Compared to
Goodson, the district court in Corso “made no effort to determine that Corso,
whose education [was] limited to a GED diploma, understood the effect of his
waiver on his right to appeal, or even whether he had discussed the waiver with
his attorney.” Id. Furthermore, the prosecutor’s “fleeting reference” to the
standard terms of a guilty plea could “hardly be deemed a ‘discussion’ of the
terms of Corso’s appellate waiver, much less an adequate substitute for the
missing safeguards of Rule 11(b)(1)(N).” Id. at 930–31.
208. See id. at 931–32 (finding the appellate waiver enforceable because the
defendant did not demonstrate that the “District Court’s deficient colloquy
seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial
proceedings[,]” and therefore failed the fourth prong of the plain error review
test). The defendant did not carry his burden under the fourth prong of plain
error review because he did not show that leaving the error uncorrected was an
offense against the justice system. See id. (“Although the right to appeal is one
of critical importance to a criminal defendant, we are unconvinced, on the record
here, that enforcing the appellate waiver in Corso’s plea agreement would result
in a miscarriage of justice.” (internal citation and quotation marks omitted)).
For a discussion of the standards for the fourth prong of plain error review, see
Edward Goolsby, Comment, Why So Serious? Taking the Word “Seriously” More
Seriously in Plain Error Review of Federal Sentencing Appeals, 51 HOUS. L. REV.
1449, 1451 (2014) (advocating three new criteria for the fourth prong, to foster
“a more consistent application of plain error review that will benefit both
defendants and federal circuit judges”).
209. 398 F.3d 491 (6th Cir. 2005).
210. See id. at 499 (ruling that the appellate waiver was unenforceable).
211. See id. at 498 (“[T]he record shows that the judge failed in his duty to
discuss the meaning of the appellate waiver provision with Murdock, that the
waiver provision was never mentioned in open court, and there is no evidence
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noted that the trial judge did not personally determine whether
the defendant had discussed the agreement with his attorney or
whether he understood the terms of the appellate waiver. 212 The
court emphasized that the technical violation of Rule 11(b)(1)(N)
alone was insufficient if there was evidence on the record of a
“functional substitute for that safeguard,” but that no such
alternative occurred. 213 The allusion to an alternative procedural
safeguard was a strong indication that the court aimed to gauge
the defendant’s understanding of his plea, instead of whether
there was a reasonable probability that he would have entered
the guilty plea but for the error. 214 Most importantly, the court
expressly declined to apply the reasonable probability standard
from Dominguez Benitez. 215 By stating that it would “instead”
that Murdock discussed any provisions of the plea agreement with his
attorney.”).
212. See id. at 497 (“[A] defendant’s substantial rights are affected by the
‘wholesale omission’ of the Rule 11-required inquiry, coupled with the absence of
any indication on the record that the defendant understood that he had a right
to appeal and that he was giving up that right.” (citing United States v.
Arellano-Gallegos, 387 F.3d 794, 797 (9th Cir. 2004))). Neither the prosecutor
nor the judge referenced the appellate waiver during the plea colloquy, which
resulted in the court’s complete failure to determine whether the defendant even
knew the appellate waiver was part of the plea agreement. Id. at 494.
213. See id. at 498 (explaining that “some other event could suffice to insure
that Defendant’s waiver was knowing and voluntary,” such as the prosecutor
adequately addressing the waiver provision). The court further stated that “[i]n
the absence of a discussion of the appellate waiver provision in open court, we
will not rely on a defendant’s self-assessment of his understanding of a plea
agreement in determining the knowingness of that plea . . . .” Id. The
insufficiency of the defendant’s self-assessment stands in stark contrast to other
circuits that rely on the testimony of the defendant that he understood the
consequences of the plea, even to uphold the voluntariness and intelligence of
the guilty plea.
214. See id. at 497–98 (noting that in the absence of any open discussion of
the appellate waiver, the court would not accept the defendant’s self-assessment
of understanding or the signed statement that he understood the agreement as
sufficient under Rule 11(b)(1)(N)).
215. See id. at 496 (stating that the court “[i]nstead” adheres to the Vonn
four-prong test). Notably, the Sixth Circuit rejected outright the government’s
argument that Dominguez Benitez applies to the appellate waiver here. See id.
(“We decline to adopt the government’s view of this issue, and instead conclude
that Dominguez Benitez is inapplicable here . . . .”). The court noted that it
considered the defendant’s appeal of his sentence and not his conviction a factor
in declining to apply Dominguez Benitez. Id.; see infra note 217 and
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adhere to the plain error review standard articulated in United
States v. Vonn, 216 the court drew attention to the confusion
surrounding the line of cases about Rule 11 errors. 217 Still, the
Sixth Circuit’s denunciation of the Dominguez Benitez standard
implied that it instead adopted a voluntary and intelligent
inquiry for plain error review of Rule 11(b)(1)(N) errors. 218
The Sixth Circuit again focused on the presence of an
alternative procedural safeguard in United States v. Robinson. 219
In Robinson, the court determined that there was a functional
equivalent for the Rule 11 advisement because the prosecutor
referred to the appellate waiver in open court and the defendant
confirmed he discussed the terms of the plea with his attorney. 220
accompanying text (discussing the reasons a defendant may appeal a
conviction).
216. See discussion supra Part III.C (detailing the review standard from
Vonn for Rule 11 violations).
217. The court pointed to the distinction between a defendant appealing for
the purpose of reversing his conviction (as in Dominguez Benitez) and a
defendant appealing for the purpose of contesting his sentence term (as in
Murdock). See United States v. Murdock, 398 F.3d 491, 496 (6th Cir. 2005)
(“Instead, we adhere to the rule set forth in United States v. Vonn, which
instructs us to review violations of Rule 11 for plain error if the defendant did
not object before the district court.”). While the distinction the Sixth Circuit
attempted to draw was imprecise and arguably irrelevant, the rejection of the
Dominguez Benitez standard was expressly apparent. See id. (declining to apply
Dominguez Benitez); infra note 227 and accompanying text (claiming that the
distinction between a defendant seeking reversal of his conviction upon a guilty
plea and a defendant appealing his sentence is not a dispositive factor in plain
error review of Rule 11(b)(1)(N) errors).
218. See Murdock, 398 F.3d at 497 (“[A] defendant’s substantial rights are
affected by the ‘wholesale omission’ of the Rule 11-required inquiry, coupled
with the absence of any indication on the record that the defendant understood
that he had a right to appeal and that he was giving up that right.” (citing
United States v. Arellano-Gallegos, 387 F.3d 794, 797 (9th Cir. 2004))); see also
discussion infra note 230 (noting the importance of Arellano-Gallegos in
influencing later cases).
219. 455 F.3d 602 (6th Cir. 2006).
220. See id. at 610 (“[W]here the defendant states that he had reviewed the
plea agreement with his attorney . . . or where the prosecutor refers to the
waiver provision in summarizing the terms of the plea agreement, this may be
sufficient to insure that the waiver was knowing and voluntary.”). Robinson also
involved a defendant appealing his sentence from a guilty plea. Id. at 609; see
also United States v. Sharp, 442 F.3d 946, 951 (6th Cir. 2006) (“[I]n the absence
of such an inquiry by the district court, a prosecutor’s summary of the key
elements of the plea agreement can be sufficient to prove that the defendant’s
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Referencing a Rule 11 alternative was evidence that the court
considered the voluntary and intelligent inquiry a better
standard of review for Rule 11(b)(1)(N) errors than the reasonable
probability standard. 221 The court upheld the appellate waiver
because the Rule 11 equivalent (i.e., the prosecutor’s statements
on the record) ensured that the defendant entered the plea
voluntarily and intelligently, not because the defendant did not
demonstrate that he would not have pleaded guilty had the judge
not erred. 222
In a seminal and precedential case, the Seventh Circuit
relied heavily on Murdock to determine that the district court’s
failure to address appellate waiver violated the defendant’s
substantial rights in United States v. Sura. 223 Involving facts
waiver was knowing and voluntary.”); United States v. Wilson, 438 F.3d 672,
674 (6th Cir. 2006) (finding the plea agreement voluntary and intelligent
because “the judge, while directly addressing defendant, instructed the United
States Attorney to explain to defendant the details of the plea agreement”).
221. See Robinson, 455 F.3d at 610 (“Thus, the substitutes for Rule 11
compliance noted in Murdock are present in this case. The failure of the district
court to specifically address defendant concerning the waiver provision did not
affect his substantial rights.”).
222. Again, it is noteworthy that the Sixth Circuit panel did not reference
Dominguez Benitez at all in Robinson, confirming its statement in Murdock that
it rejected the application of only the objective plain error standard for Rule
11(b)(1)(N) errors. See id. (citing Murdock’s plain error review analysis).
223. See United States v. Sura, 511 F.3d 654, 662 (7th Cir. 2007) (“We
conclude that Sura’s waiver of his appellate rights was not knowing and
voluntary.”). The facts in Sura are an exceptional illustration of the importance
of the voluntary and intelligent test, which is perhaps a reason why the Seventh
Circuit seized upon this case to delve into appellate waiver. The defendant, a
convicted felon, was charged as a felon in unlawful possession of a firearm, a
World War II Beretta pistol that he kept as a memento from a friend. Id. at
655–56. Sura pleaded guilty to the charge, stating “I do have a conviction of a
felony on my record, I was in possession of the Beretta, so I have to plead
guilty.” Id. at 656. The district court declined to apply a sentencing reduction for
the fact that Sura did not possess any ammunition and had never unlawfully
discharged the weapon. Id. In ruling to vacate the appellate waiver, the Seventh
Circuit found these facts to be relevant because
[w]e think it likely that [Sura] would have assessed his strategic
position differently had he realized that he was losing the chance to
challenge the district court’s sentencing decision, which was based
primarily on crimes unrelated to the crime of conviction and gave
little weight to Sura’s individual circumstances.
Id. at 662.
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similar to those in Murdock, the court pointed to the absence of
any mention of the appellate waiver on the record from either the
judge or the prosecutor as constituting plain error. 224 Echoing
Murdock, 225 the lack of any alternative procedural safeguard
prevented the appellate court from affirming that the defendant’s
admission of understanding was sufficient under Rule
11(b)(1)(N). 226 The court explained that a voluntariness and
intelligence analysis was part of determining whether the
defendant had satisfied the substantial rights prong of plain error
review under Dominguez Benitez. 227 However, the court hardly
224. See id. (describing the thoroughness of the colloquy, but noting that
there was no evidence on the record that the defendant was informed of and
understood the appellate waiver). The court focused on the facts that the judge
did not address the waiver in open court or ask the defendant whether his
attorney advised him of the waiver. Id.
225. See id. (mimicking Murdock’s language that “[i]f the safeguard required
by Rule 11 is missing, the record must reveal an adequate substitute for it, and
the defendant must show why the omission made a difference to him”).
226. See id. (“Sura’s explanation for why he accepted the plea agreement
gives no assurance that he understood this aspect of the deal . . . .”). The court
went on to state that based on Sura’s interaction with the judge during the
colloquy, “he may mistakenly have thought that he had to accept the agreement
because he was willing to admit to his guilt, when in fact he could have pleaded
guilty without a plea agreement.” Id.; see United States v. Murdock, 398 F.3d
491, 498 (6th Cir. 2005) (describing the effects of a “wholesale omission” of Rule
11(b)(1)(N)).
227. See Sura, 511 F.3d at 662 (“One step (although not the only step) along
the way to the defendant’s demonstration that the error affected his decision to
plead guilty is to look at whether the defendant understood his plea
agreement.”). The Seventh Circuit’s inquiry contrasts the Sixth Circuit’s
rejection of Dominguez Benitez because Sura, like Murdock, appealed his
sentence term, but the Seventh Circuit did not find the sentencing appeal to be
a dispositive factor. See id. at 655–56 (“Sura now wants to challenge that
sentence, but in order to do so, he first must convince us that his appeal waiver
should be set aside.”). Sura in turn requested his plea be entirely vacated on
direct appeal, instead of only challenging his sentence, and the court conceded
that the nature of the entire plea agreement was at issue. See id. (“[W]e
conclude that Sura has shown that he did not knowingly and voluntarily accept
the plea (including its waiver of his appellate rights) and thus that the district
court plainly erred when it accepted the plea.”). This outcome illuminates the
ambiguity of the Sixth Circuit’s ruling in Murdock, because Murdock rejected
Dominguez Benitez, but both the Sixth and Seventh Circuits ruled to set aside
the appeal waiver. Compare id. at 655–66 (noting that Sura’s plea to set aside
the appellate waiver arose from his attempt to appeal his sentence), with
Murdock, 398 F.3d at 496 (“We decline to adopt the government’s view of this
issue, and instead conclude that Dominguez Benitez is inapplicable here because
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returned to the reasonable probability test after mentioning it,
instead concentrating on the totality of the circumstances of the
colloquy. 228 Sura established critical precedent regarding
appellate waiver because the court emphasized the practical
importance of the colloquy as a safeguard for criminal appellate
rights, a function that many judges gloss over to preserve the
finality of a guilty plea. 229
In summary, the Second, Third, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits
expressly incorporated the voluntary and intelligence inquiry into
plain error review of Rule 11(b)(1)(N) errors. 230 In particular, the
Murdock is not seeking to reverse his conviction, but merely to void the
appellate waiver provision in order to challenge his sentence.”).
228. See Sura, 511 F.3d at 662 (describing “Sura’s confused responses to the
district judge’s questions, his age, and his mental condition” as relevant
considerations). The district court determined that the defendant did not feel his
medication or psychological treatment would affect his decision and that he was
satisfied with his representation, but not that he understood his waiver of
appeal. Id. at 656; see also United States v. Loutos, 383 F.3d 615, 619 (7th Cir.
2004) (noting that the defendant was a practicing attorney with significant
experience reading and entering contracts, which satisfied the court that his
appellate waiver was voluntary and intelligent despite the technical Rule
11(b)(1)(N) violation by the court). Although Loutos involved harmless error, not
plain error, the Sura court still treated Loutos as applicable law, stating that
the
validity of a Rule 11 colloquy is based on the totality of the
circumstances, including such factors as the complexity of the charge,
the defendant’s level of intelligence, age, and education, whether the
defendant was represented by counsel, the judge’s inquiry during the
plea hearing and the defendant’s statements, as well as the evidence
proffered by the government.
Id. at 659 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).
229. See United States v. Sura, 511 F.3d 654, 662 (7th Cir. 2007) (stating
that if the court were to “assume that the waiver was knowing and voluntary
based only on the facts that Sura . . . is literate and signed the agreement, we
would render meaningless not only Rule 11(b)(1)(N), but also the broader
inquiry into prejudice that the Supreme Court requires”). See discussion infra
Part V (discussing constitutional and policy concerns about defendants entering
guilty pleas with appellate waivers, specifically in light of the concerns the court
expressed in Sura).
230. See supra notes 195, 201, 213, 228–229 (applying the two-step analysis
to ensure the purpose of Rule 11(b)(1)(N) was maintained and the defendant’s
rights were protected). The Ninth Circuit’s ruling in United States v.
Arellano-Gallegos, 387 F.3d 794 (2004), is also of noteworthy importance for the
plain error review of Rule 11(b)(1)(N) errors. See supra note 144 (providing
background on the lack of case law in the Ninth Circuit on this issue and noting
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Sixth and Seventh Circuits established leading cases and clearly
articulated the importance of the voluntariness and intelligence
inquiry to preserve the safeguard role of Rule 11. 231 Still, the
effects and policy behind implementing a voluntariness and
intelligence inquiry on a widespread scale have not been
adequately explored, even though these circuits present
compelling demonstrations of how a lower court can easily neglect
a voluntariness and intelligence examination.
V. Argument for Adopting the Two-Part Inquiry: The Purpose of
Rule 11(b)(1)(N) and the Effects of Adding the Voluntariness and
Intelligence Inquiry
The circuit split forces appellate courts to weigh the
efficiency of enforcing a guilty plea, despite a procedural error,
against the fairness and accuracy concerns that arise from
imposing a defendant’s involuntary and unintelligent appeal
waiver. 232 This tug-of-war grapples with pertinent issues for a
criminal justice system characterized by an overwhelming
caseload and high incarceration rate. 233 On the one hand, if
the value of the ruling in Arellano-Gallegos). Various circuits cite to
Arellano-Gallegos in their analyses under Dominguez Benitez. See supra notes
157, 158, 212, 218 (citing to Arellano-Gallegos and using the voluntariness and
intelligence inquiry). The Ninth Circuit refused to enforce the appellate waiver
because “[t]he sentencing judge neither ‘addressed the defendant personally’
regarding the waiver nor ‘determined that the defendant understood’ the
meaning of the waiver.” Arellano-Gallegos, 387 F.3d at 797. Importantly, the
Ninth Circuit used the rhetoric that the other circuits turn to in their
post-Dominguez Benitez cases. Id. (“Because this was not a technical violation of
Rule 11, but rather a wholesale omission, and there is nothing elsewhere in the
record to indicate that Arellano understood the right to appeal his sentence, his
substantial rights were affected.” (emphasis added)).
231. See supra notes 212–214, 228–229 and accompanying text (discussing
the value of Sura and Murdock in guiding circuits on thorough voluntariness
and intelligence examination).
232. See Cook, supra note 40, at 638 (“[The] federal plea process . . . too often
devalues individual due process in favor of judicial economy.”).
233. See Judge Jed S. Rakoff, Why Innocent People Plead Guilty, N.Y. REV.
BOOKS (Nov. 20, 2014), http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2014/11/20/whyinnocent-people-plead-guilty/?insrc=whc (last visited Mar. 2, 2017) (“[T]he
information-deprived defense lawyer, typically within a few days after the
arrest, meets with the overconfident prosecutor, who makes clear that, unless
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courts apply only the objective standard under Dominguez
Benitez, the likelihood that an appeal will dismantle a plea
agreement decreases, preserving finality of the conviction. 234 On
the other hand, enforcing an appellate waiver against a
defendant who has a meritorious claim of misunderstanding
denies a defendant relief because of an unjust procedural error. 235
In light of these considerations, there are three significant
reasons to add a voluntariness and intelligence inquiry to plain
error review of Rule 11(b)(1)(N) errors. 236 The Supreme Court has
repeatedly indicated that due process ensures certain aspects of
the appeals process for criminal defendants, even if due process
does not guarantee the right to appeal itself. 237 Furthermore,
Congress passed Rule 11 as a procedural safeguard to ensure the
voluntariness and intelligence of a guilty plea in the post-Boykin
period. 238 If a court neglects the Rule 11(b)(1)(N) advisement,
Boykin requires that there be some measure, either at the plea
hearing or on appeal, to ensure the voluntariness and intelligence
the case can be promptly resolved by a plea bargain, he intends to charge the
defendant with the most severe offenses he can prove.”) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
234. See Cook, supra note 40, at 639 (discussing the Supreme Court’s focus
on finality in United States v. Timmreck, 441 U.S. 780 (1979), “especially in the
context of habeas corpus challenges to the Rule 11 process”); id. at 635 (noting
that a mere “technical violation of Rule 11, without more, would not warrant
collateral relief” (citing Timmreck, 441 U.S. at 784)).
235. See supra Part III.B (describing the effect of an appellate waiver as
severely impairing, if not eliminating, a defendant’s opportunity for appeal).
236. The argument in Part V focuses on why adding the voluntariness and
intelligence inquiry is pertinent to securing what remains of a defendant’s
rights after he enters a guilty plea. Importantly, this Note does not argue that
Dominguez Benitez should not still apply to other Rule 11 errors. For Rule
11(b)(1)(N) errors, Dominguez Benitez should apply as a standard for Rule
11(b)(1)(N) errors alongside the voluntariness and intelligence inquiry. See
supra Part IV (detailing the approaches of the circuits and noting that even
among the circuits that use a voluntariness and intelligence inquiry, there is no
clear consensus on whether such an inquiry is in addition to or in place of the
reasonable probability standard from Dominguez Benitez).
237. See infra notes 251–252 and accompanying text (advocating that some
degree of due process is required for the appellate process, although due process
does not guarantee the right to access the appellate process itself).
238. See discussion supra Part II.B (detailing the history of Rule 11 and the
purpose behind the amendments).
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of the appellate waiver. 239 Finally, adding the voluntariness and
intelligence appellate inquiry offers lower courts guidance when
administering the Rule 11 colloquy and results in more consistent
outcomes for defendants, who can receive contrary results in
different circuits. 240 Importantly, many of the circuits already
conduct a voluntary and intelligence inquiry, whether express or
not, which is evidence that a number of courts do not consider
Dominguez Benitez to be sufficient for Rule 11(b)(1)(N) plain error
review. 241
Although the right to appeal is entrenched in modern society,
its historical role in the United States is limited. 242 Because
federal access to review for criminal convictions did not exist
until 1879, 243 and states have granted the right to appeal
sporadically over the last century, 244 appeals were not an ancient
practice in the United States. Dating back to McKane v.
Durston, 245 the Supreme Court has held that the right to appeal
and the terms of any appeal are within the discretion of the
239. See infra notes 253–262 and accompanying text (arguing that Rule
11(b)(1)(N) requires an examination of the voluntariness and intelligence of the
appellate waiver, making Dominguez Benitez insufficient for review).
240. See infra notes 264–269 (discussing the rationale and effects of adding
the voluntariness and intelligence inquiry).
241. See discussion supra Part IV (presenting the different approaches of the
circuits, which generally fall into three main categories: circuits that use only
the objective test; circuits that claim to only use the objective test, but add a
voluntariness and intelligence inquiry; and circuits that acknowledge the
voluntariness and intelligence inquiry).
242. See YACKLE, supra note 69, at 66 (discussing the Article III power of
Congress to “ordain and establish” inferior federal courts with appellate
jurisdiction, which implies that the founders did not require a federal automatic
right of appeal for cases outside the Supreme Court’s appellate grant).
Additionally, the role of the federal courts of appeals is further restrained by
Congress’s power to determine the jurisdiction of the circuit courts. See id. at
67–79 (detailing the “cases and controversies” for which Congress can control
and grant appellate jurisdiction to the inferior federal courts).
243. See Harry G. Fins, Is the Right of Appeal Protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment?, 54 JUDICATURE 296, 296 (1971) (“[F]rom 1789 to 1879, a period of
90 years, a person who was convicted criminally by a federal court had no right
of review.” (citation omitted)).
244. See Robertson, supra note 61, at 1222, 1235 (examining states’
adoptions of appeals as of right in criminal cases).
245. 153 U.S. 684 (1894).
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state. 246 Thus, the argument that access to the appellate process
is required by the due process clause fails because the right to
appeal is neither a fundamental right nor “deeply rooted” in
tradition. 247
However, even if the right to appeal has not earned its place
among due process guarantees because of its absence in the
historical narrative of deeply rooted traditions, the Supreme
Court has still opined repeatedly that some degree of due process
is required when access to appeals exists through state
constitution or statute. 248 A defendant pursuing appellate review
246. See id. at 687
A review by an appellate court of the final judgment in a criminal
case, however grave the offence of which the accused is convicted, was
not at common law and is not now a necessary element of due process
of law. It is wholly within the discretion of the State to allow or not to
allow such a review.
247. See, e.g., Robertson, supra note 61, at 1238 (“This lack of clarity,
combined with the Supreme Court’s own refusal to extend due process
protection to the right of appeal suggests that the Court will be unlikely to
locate such a right in an originalist conception of historical practice.”); Fins,
supra note 243, at 296 (“In the light of these historical facts, the earlier holdings
of the United States Supreme Court that the right of appeal was not part of ‘due
process of law’ was understandable.”).
248. See discussion supra Part III.A (discussing the appeals process). The
Court in Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956), ruled that when the state
requires a defendant to produce a transcript with his petition for appeal, the
state must pay the costs to procure the transcript for an indigent defendant. See
id. at 19 (“There can be no equal justice where the kind of trial a man gets
depends on the amount of money he has.”). Furthermore, the Supreme Court
found that a state violates due process when it provides a first appeal as of right
but only offers appointed counsel if the defendant demonstrates his claim is
meritorious. See Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 357 (1963) (“When an
indigent is forced to run this gantlet of a preliminary showing of merit, the right
to appeal does not comport with fair procedure.”). In Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S.
52 (1985), the Court ruled that ineffective assistance of counsel claims were
possible regarding plea bargaining if the defendant demonstrated that his
counsel’s performance was deficient and that he was prejudiced by the
deficiency. See id. at 59 (requiring the defendant to show that “there is a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded
guilty and would have insisted on going to trial”). Recently, the Court issued
opinions in Lafler v. Cooper and Frye v. Missouri that further illuminated a
defendant’s right to effective assistance of counsel in the plea bargaining
process. See Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1385 (2012) (ruling that a
defendant must show the plea deal would have been extended by the
prosecution and accepted by the court to demonstrate prejudice for ineffective
assistance of counsel during plea bargaining); Frye v. Missouri, 132 S. Ct. 1399,
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garners due process protection to some extent, but due process
itself does not require access to an appeals process. 249 Notably,
the Supreme Court stated in Evitts v. Lucey 250 that “[a] system of
appeal as of right is established precisely to assure that only
those who are validly convicted have their freedom drastically
curtailed.” 251 Although the right to appeal is not a constitutional
right because “its origins are neither constitutional nor ancient,
the right has become, in a word, sacrosanct.” 252
The appellate process may exist in a gray area between a
constitutional guarantee and a statutory entitlement, but its
central role in the criminal justice process still earned it a
1408 (2012) (deciding that defense counsel has an affirmative obligation to
communicate a plea offer to a defendant).
249. See, e.g., Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 28–29 (1970) (ruling that it
was “not constitutionally permissible for the State to respond to Perry’s
invocation of his statutory right to appeal by bringing a more serious charge
against him prior to the trial de novo”). Although access to appellate review may
not be required under due process, the Court in Blackledge ruled that the
defendant’s statutory right to seek de novo review was protected by due process.
See id. at 28 (“[S]ince the fear of such vindictiveness may unconstitutionally
deter a defendant’s exercise of the right to appeal or collaterally attack his first
conviction, due process also requires that a defendant be freed of apprehension
of such a retaliatory motivation on the part of the sentencing judge.” (internal
quotation omitted)); see also supra notes 75–77 (discussing Blackledge in the
context of constitutional issues that may survive an appellate waiver).
250. 469 U.S. 387 (1985).
251. See id. at 399–400. In Evitts, the Court ruled that although “the
Constitution does not require States to grant appeals as of right to criminal
defendants seeking to review alleged trial court errors,” a state needed to
appoint a lawyer for first appeals as of right if the state has provided for an
appellate process at all. See id. at 393–94 (stating that the Due Process and
Equal Protection clauses of the Constitution require that an indigent defendant
receive appointed counsel to prevent an appeal from merely functioning as a
“meaningless ritual” (internal citation omitted)). However, in Ross v. Moffitt,
417 U.S. 600 (1974), the Court decided that the Constitution did not require the
extension of the right to appointed counsel under Gideon v. Wainwright, 372
U.S. 335 (1963), to apply to discretionary appeals. See Ross, 417 U.S. at 618
(determining that discretionary appeals fall outside the scope of required
assistance of counsel).
252. See Harlon Leigh Dalton, Taking the Right to Appeal (More or Less)
Seriously, 95 YALE L.J. 62, 23 (1985) (claiming that the right to appeal is held in
a special, mostly untouched, trust in America); see also United States v.
Murdock, 398 F.3d 491, 498 (6th Cir. 2005) (“The right to appeal, while not of
constitutional dimension, is nonetheless of critical importance to a criminal
defendant.” (citing Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 656 (1977))).
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carefully guarded place in Rule 11. 253 The history of Rule 11
indicates that Congress amended Rule 11 after Boykin v. Alabama
in an attempt to ensure the voluntariness and intelligence of a
guilty plea in general. 254 Even though the constitutional rights to a
jury trial, representation by counsel, and privilege against selfincrimination 255 are still prophylactic aspects of due process in
criminal proceedings, the increased use of guilty pleas and appellate
waivers diminishes the function of these rights. 256 Because appellate
waivers have gained popularity in lieu of defendants proceeding to
trial, 257 Rule 11 has assumed an especially important role as a
safeguard. 258 If the court excludes the Rule 11(b)(1)(N) advisement
or a functional equivalent, then there is likely no precaution to
ensure the voluntariness and intelligence of the plea and to prevent
abuse of the appeal waivers. 259 Boykin v. Alabama260 requires that
253. See discussion supra Parts II.B (providing the procedural background of
Rule 11) and III.B (discussing appellate waiver).
254. See discussion supra Parts II.A (analyzing the outcome of Boykin v.
Alabama and its effect on the guilty plea colloquy, which requires that there be
an affirmative showing on the record of the defendant’s voluntariness and
intelligence in entering the guilty plea).
255. See discussion supra Part II.A (reviewing the constitutional rights at
stake in a guilty plea).
256. See Dalton, supra note 252, at 63 (“[T]he right to appeal has in practice
begun to shrink to a mere formality in many jurisdictions as appellate judges
severely restrict oral argument, deliberate alone, write skeletal opinions, write
unpublished opinions, affirm without opinion, and in some cases rule from the
bench.”).
257. See Cook, supra note 40, at 628 (“[I]t is tenable to surmise that most
defendants summarily waive their appellate rights with respect to plea and/or
sentencing matters without an adequate comprehension of the impact of the
waiver.”).
258. See id. at 632 (“Without more, a meaningful discernment of such waiver
provisions, and thus, a knowing and voluntary relinquishment of appellate
privileges, cannot be blithely presumed.”).
259. See United States v. Sura, 511 F.3d 654, 662 (7th Cir. 2007) (“Here, the
record does not reveal any substitute for the safeguards of Rule 11 . . . . Rule
11(b)(1)(N), or its equivalent for plain error purposes, exists precisely to ensure
that the defendant actually knows what rights he is signing away.”); United
States v. Murdock, 398 F.3d 491, 497–98 (6th Cir. 2005) (“We emphasize that in
the absence of an inquiry into the appellate waiver by the district court as
required under the rule, some other event could suffice to insure that
Defendant’s waiver was knowing and voluntary.”).
260. See discussion supra Part II.A (providing the minimum constitutional
requirements for the court to accept a defendant’s guilty plea in Boykin v.
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the court verify the voluntariness and intelligence of the guilty
plea, which must be done at the appellate review if the trial court
failed to do so. 261 The Dominguez Benitez standard of whether the
record establishes that the defendant would not have pleaded,
but for the error, is too stringent when compared to the
constitutional floor required by Boykin and Rule 11’s role to
protect the defendant’s appellate access. 262
Most significantly, defendants may fare differently in various
circuits when challenging the enforceability of an appeal waiver.
Under the strict approach of the Fifth Circuit, a defendant would
likely be held to his appellate waiver despite the lower court’s
failure to inquire about the defendant’s understanding of waiving
the right to appeal his conviction or his sentence. 263
Comparatively, under the Seventh Circuit’s approach, an
appellate court would examine the degree to which the lower
court discussed the consequences of the waiver with the
defendant, and specifically the inability to appeal. 264 The Second,
Alabama; specifically, the record must show a positive affirmation of the
defendant’s voluntariness and intelligence when entering the guilty plea).
261. See Cook, supra note 40, at 629 (advocating that an “oral explication of
what was understood, or, at a minimum, judicial implementation of an
alternative method of discerning defendant comprehension and intent” is
required to show on the record that the appellate waiver was voluntary and
intelligent).
262. See id. at 637–38 (“The protective ideals evinced by the Supreme Court
in . . . Boykin, and the congressional intent underlying the 1975 revision of Rule
11, have been subjected to an array of erosive appellate interpretations.”). The
reasonable probability inquiry from Dominguez Benitez also imposes a circular
burden of proof on the defendant because if the record does not contain
sufficient evidence to appeal under Dominguez Benitez, it is likely because the
judge did not conduct a voluntariness and intelligence inquiry on the record.
263. See discussion supra Part IV.A (developing the stringent objective
approach of the Fifth Circuit under Dominguez Benitez, in which the Fifth
Circuit only searches for evidence that the defendant would not have pleaded
guilty had the judge not erred).
264. See discussion supra Part IV.C (describing the circuits that adopt a
voluntariness and intelligence inquiry to satisfy Rule 11 and Boykin
requirements). Additionally, the First Circuit explicitly acknowledged the
potential difference in outcomes in United States v. Borrero-Acevedo, 533 F.3d
11 (1st Cir. 2008), in which the court attempted to distinguish the facts of
United States v. Sura, 511 F.3d 654 (7th Cir. 2007), from its own case. See supra
notes 159–163 and accompanying text (noting the factual differences between
Borrero-Acevedo and Sura, and implying that there was a set of circumstances
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Third, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits’ opinions reflect a
comprehensive expectation that the lower court endeavor further
into colloquy and at minimum discern the defendant’s education,
family history, and mental stability. 265 These circuits encourage
questions that require active participation from the defendant to
prevent the colloquy from turning into a sham or farce composed
of leading questions. 266 Furthermore, a defendant’s admission of
guilt at the plea hearing is questionable if the court did not
advise him of the waiver, potentially making his own affirmance
irrelevant. 267 While lower courts are not required to subscribe to
a scripted dialogue, the variations of the standard of review
prevent trial judges from having the uniform understanding that
in which the First Circuit would venture to the degree of the Seventh Circuit’s
analysis). See also United States v. Cook, 722 F.3d 477, 482 (2d Cir. 2013)
(analyzing whether there was a “realistic possibility that [the defendant] might
have misunderstood the nature or source of the waiver”); United States v.
Goodson, 544 F.3d 529, 540 (3d Cir. 2008) (stating the court could not “ignore
that there was no effort to verify that Goodson understood the breadth of the
waiver”); United States v. Murdock, 398 F.3d 491, 498 (6th Cir. 2005) (rejecting
the application of Dominguez Benitez to Rule 11(b)(1)(N) error).
265. See supra note 228 (providing factors that courts examine when
determining voluntariness and intelligence); discussion supra Part IV.C
(presenting the circuits that incorporate a voluntariness and intelligence inquiry
into their Rule 11(b)(1)(N) reviews by examining the transcript of the colloquy
and personal factors about the defendant to determine whether he understood
the appeal waiver). Furthermore, the First, Fourth, and Eighth Circuits’
acknowledgment of the voluntariness and intelligence inquiry indicates that
these courts recognize the value of a further inquiry, but have struggled to apply
it as expressly as the circuits in Part IV.C. See discussion supra Part IV.B
(noting that the circuits in this category acknowledge and even employ the
voluntariness and intelligence inquiry, but that they still explicitly cling only to
the Dominguez Benitez standard).
266. See Wheeler, supra note 26, at 317 (articulating “Suggested Questions
for the Court to Ask in Taking a Guilty Plea” that require active participation
from the defendant); Cook, supra note 40, at 615 (recommending judges turn
away from leading questions during plea hearing colloquies because of the same
concerns that support Federal Rule of Evidence 613).
267. See United States v. Murdock, 398 F.3d 491, 498 (6th Cir. 2005)
In the absence of a discussion of the appellate waiver provision in
open court, we will not rely on a defendant’s self-assessment of his
understanding of a plea agreement in determining the knowingness
of that plea, even where, as the government emphasizes is the case
here, the defendant is sophisticated or has significant experience with
the criminal justice system.
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their plea colloquies should garner whether the defendant
voluntarily and intelligently waived his access to the appellate
process. 268
In addition to concerns about consistent outcomes, norms of
the justice system such as finality, fairness, and accuracy are
improved by adopting the voluntariness and intelligence
inquiry. 269 Adopting the secondary inquiry for appeal of Rule
11(b)(1)(N) errors will provide the lower courts with guidance to
ensure that guilty pleas are not overturned on appeal, thus
enhancing finality. 270 Engaging in a deeper colloquy may sacrifice
a minimal degree of efficiency at the trial level, but guilty pleas
are already the archetype of efficiency in the justice system. 271 By
contracting with a defendant to waive his constitutional rights,
fairness and accuracy are principles of the justice system that
become vulnerable during plea bargaining. 272 The appellate
268. See Trial Judge to Appeals Court: Review Me, supra note 5 (discussing
the dynamic opinion issued by Judge Kane in United States v. Vanderwerff);
United States v. Vanderwerff, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89812 (D. Colo. June 28,
2012), rev’d, 788 F.3d 1266 (10th Cir. 2015). In Vanderwerff, the district court
rejected the defendant’s appeal waiver, despite the defendant’s prayer for the
court to enforce the waiver to achieve his plea deal. Id. at *10. On appeal, the
Tenth Circuit ruled that the district court’s rejection of the appeal waiver was
an abuse of discretion. Vanderwerff, 788 F.3d at 1272. Judge Kane elaborates on
his adamant rejection of the appellate waiver in Vanderwerff in his article about
guilty pleas and the modern justice system. See Judge John L. Kane, Plea
Bargaining and the Innocent, MARSHALL PROJECT (Dec. 26. 2014, 1:05 PM),
https://www.themarshallproject.org/2014/12/26/plea-bargaining-and-theinnocent#.J0tAIr9bW (last visited Mar. 2, 2017) (“My question then is this: am I
and my fellow jurists doing enough each day to replace the mindless practice of
assembly-line plea bargaining with a process that is based on integrity and that
aspires to justice rather than succumbs to the cynicism of convenience?”) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
269. See Vanderwerff, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89812, at *8 (“Indiscriminate
acceptance of appellate waivers undermines the ability of appellate courts to
ensure the constitutional validity of convictions and to maintain consistency and
reasonableness in sentencing decisions.”).
270. See Wheeler, supra note 26, at 306 (“A more comprehensive guilty plea
inquiry . . . makes good practice from both the defense and prosecution
perspectives . . . . Convictions obtained on the basis of such inquiries are more
likely to withstand appellate review.”).
271. See Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1388 (2012) (“[C]riminal justice
today is for the most part a system of pleas, not a system of trials.”).
272. See id. at 1397 (Scalia, J. dissenting) (arguing that the plea bargaining
process “presents grave risks of prosecutorial overcharging that effectively
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process is necessary for preserving accuracy and the ability to
recreate results given the amount of discretion awarded to judges
in sentencing and prosecutors in charging. 273
VI. Conclusion
Under the two-part framework that includes Dominguez
Benitez alongside a voluntariness and intelligence inquiry, the
defendant must show evidence that he did not understand his
appellate waiver at the time he entered his plea. Dominguez
Benitez is still useful on appeal because if the defendant satisfies
the objective but-for test, he likely also satisfies the voluntary
and intelligence examination; however, the same cannot be said if
the tests are reversed. Together, the objective test under
Dominguez Benitez and the voluntariness and intelligence review
encourage trial courts to establish detailed records of the
colloquy, which is required under Boykin. The voluntariness and
intelligence inquiry still requires a stringent showing from the
defendant that his substantial rights were affected, but it further
urges the lower courts to conduct a more thorough colloquy.
The Second, Third, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits present cases
in which the two-step inquiry is a workable standard capable of
producing different outcomes than review under the purely
objective standard. 274 The possible difference in outcomes under
the current ambiguity is sufficient to validate due process
concerns that unless there is a voluntary and intelligence inquiry
at the guilty plea colloquy, there is no mechanism to ensure the
defendant’s understanding of the appellate waiver. Furthermore,
adding a voluntariness and intelligence inquiry alongside the
objective standard for review of Rule 11(b)(1)(N) errors resolves
the tension between finality, efficiency, and fairness. The
compels an innocent defendant to avoid massive risk by pleading guilty to a
lesser offense”).
273. See Trial Judge to Appeals Court: Review Me, supra note 5 (“The
defendants must then choose between the risk of being found guilty at trial and
getting a longer sentence than the alleged crime would warrant or a guilty plea
in exchange for a lighter sentence.”).
274. See supra Part IV.B (discussing the line of cases that apply the two-step
inquiry).
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addition of the voluntariness and intelligence inquiry is not
overly burdensome on the courts, will not affect finality of guilty
pleas negatively, and protects appellate rights as a principal
safeguard in the criminal justice system.

